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INTRODUCTION
In 1971, agents of the federal government seized a $20,000 yacht
after finding a small quantity of marijuana on board. Ten years later
'Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 665-67 (1974)
(holding that seizure did not deny due process regardless of lack ofpre-seizure notice and
hearing).
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government agents confiscated a twenty-eight foot boat that held drugs
consisting of one marijuana twig and two marijuana leaves Since then,
the government has taken possession of a $250,000 home because a drug
transaction occurred in a car parked in the driveway' and of a smaller
dwelling because the owner used the telephone inside to set up a drug
deal at another location4 In another incident, local, county, state, and
federal agents shot and killed the owner of a Malibu, California ranch
during a raid on the property.5 The government excused its actions on
the mistaken assumption that the owner had grown marijuana on the land,
but the Ventura County District Attorney's office concluded that "the Los
Angeles County Sheriff's Department was motivated, at least in par, by
a desire to seize and forfeit the ranch for the government." Actions like
these, even when they involve citizens who cannot be characterized as
completely innocent, have fueled recent criticism of civil forfeiture
statutes.
The statistical evidence of forfeiture actions supports the anecdotal
evidence of aggressive enforcement. Since 1984, government agencies
have executed more than 200,000 forfeiture actions.7 The value of these
forfeitures has increased each year, with the federal government seizing
cash and property with a total value of $580 million in 1989, compared
with $207 million in 1988 and $94 million in 1986.8 By most estimates,
forfeitures have added over $1 billion to state and federal budgets since
the mid-1980s.9 The Department of Justice asset-sharing program split
2 United States v. One 1982 28' Int'lVessel, 741 F.2d 1319, 1320 (11th Cir. 1984)
(affirming that forfeiture was appropriate notwithstanding the small quantity of marijuana
found).
3 United States v. 3097 S.W. 111th Ave., 921 F.2d 1551, 1557 (11th Cir. 1991)
(holding that Congress expressly contemplated forfeiture of the whole tract of property
based on drug activity on a portion of the trat).
4 United States v. 916 Douglas Ave., 903 F.2d 490, 491 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding
that there was a "substantial connection" between the house and the homeowner's drug
activities), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126 (1991).
1 David Heilbroner, The Law Goes On a Treasure Hunt, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1994,
§ 6 (Magazine), at 70.
"Id. (quoting a report of the Ventura County District Attorney's Office).
7 See Heilbroner, supra note 5 (declaring that such forfeiture actions have netted
$3.6 billion in assets).
I Joy Chatman, Losing the Battle, but Not the War: The Future Use of Civil
Forfeiture by Law Enforcement Agencies fter Austin v. United States, 38 ST. LouIS U.
L.J. 739, 747 (1994).
9 See Heilbroner, supra note 5 (estimating $3.6 billion with $1.7 billion still"in the
pipeline"); Charles Oliver, A Forfeiture of Civil Liberties?, INVESTOR'S BUS. DAILY, Mar.
7, 1995, at Al (estimating a total of $3.2 billion).
1994-95]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
approximately $826 million in cash and property in one five-year
period.'0
The government generated these resources with relatively little effort.
In more than eighty percent of civil forfeiture cases, neither the state nor
the federal government ever charges the potential claimant with a
crime," and because indigent property owners, unlike indigent defen-
dants, do not receive court-appointed attorneys, many feel that they
cannot afford to reclaim the property.' Under ever-increasing budget
constraints, "[1]aw enforcement on the federal, state and local levels
became increasingly dependent on the much-needed revenue generated
under these statutes."'" Yet as agencies increased their dependence on
forfeiture, well-publicized confiscations focused attention on these actions
and led to calls for reform.
14
As the use of forfeiture increased, even government officials began
to recognize the possibility of mixed priorities in the forfeiture pro-
grams.5 After the Malibu, California ranch seizure, California redrafted
its forfeiture laws to require a criminal conviction."6 Legislators in the
state of Washington have also considered various proposals to control
enforcement of forfeiture laws, such as setting a seizure minimum to
confine the use of the law to property connected with major drug deal-
ers.17 On the federal level, Representative Henry Hyde, a Republican
from Illinois, and Representative John Coyners, Jr., a Democrat from
10Adoption of Recommendations and Statement Regarding Administrative Practice
and Procedure, 59 Fed. Reg. 44,701, 44,703 n.6 (1994) (sharing over $736 million incash
and $90 million in property with state and local agencies).
1 Oliver, supra note 9 (stating that with civil forfeiture, the government can seize
property allegedly used in a crime without engaging in a criminal prosecution).
S See WiMim Chesire, How the Government, Sate and Federal, Ignores the Bill of
Rights, ARiz. REPuB., Feb. 16, 1995, at B6 (stating that, in many states, to contest seizure
of assets, claimants must post a cash bond of 10% within 10 days or they forfeit the
seized property).
' Chatman, supra note 8, at 739.
" Id. at 740 (citing high profile reports of abuse of civil forfeiture as the reason for
reform).
"S ee John H. Hingson HI, A Cryfor Reform; Revamping the Government's Power
to Seize, CONN. L. TiBM. May 16, 1994, at 25 (quoting the former director of the
Department of Justice's Asset Forfeitur Office, Michael Zeldin. "We had a situation in
which the desire to deposit money into the asset-forfeiture fund became the reason for
being of forfeiture, eclipsing in certain measure the desire to effect fair enforcement of
the laws as a matter of pure law-enforcement objectives.").
'6 See Heilbroner, supra note 5.
7 Russell Carrollo & Dean Marchionni, Sate Drug Forfeiture Law Faces Review,
Changes, NEWS TRIB., July 22, 1994, at Al (proposing a minimum seizure of $5000).
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Michigan, each proposed legislation designed to limit forfeiture abuses,
although a review proposed by Attorney General Janet Reno preempted
their efforts. 8 Similarly, the Administrative Conference of the United
States attempted to address what it considered a "fundamental issue about
the fairness and effectiveness of the entire administrative civil sei-
zure/forfeiture process," by recommending the establishment of a Central
Forfeiture Registry and time limits to provide better notice to claimants
- a considerably watered-down version of the original proposal'
Initially, legal arguments for reform met with little success. Courts
felt unable to control law enforcement agencies, given the permissive
language of the statutes and the presumed inapplicability of most
constitutional protections in the civil context. By 1993, only one circuit
court had declared that forfeitures could sometimes rise to such a level
as to violate the Eighth Amendment.20 Other circuits expressed dissatis-
faction with the law but apparently felt bound to allow all seizures in
which the government had met the statutory requirements.2' In Austin
v. United States, the Supreme Court reversed this trend by unanimously
holding that the lower courts could overturn civil forfeitures on the
grounds that they constituted constitutionally excessive fines, and by
directing the inferior courts to establish a test for excessiveness?2
This Article surveys the approaches taken by courts in fashioning a
test to satisfy Austin. It begins with a brief overview of the applicability
of the Eighth Amendment in general, especially the Excessive Fines
Clause,' and a review of the reasoning which led the Supreme Court to
apply the Eighth Amendment to civil forfeiture cases. ' This Article then
examines the scope of the Austin decision, including the difficult question
" See Hingson, supra note 15 (discussing how the Department of Justice's proposals
backed off from the stance taken by the two bills).
See Adoption of Recommendations and Statement Regarding Administrative
Practice and Procedure, 59 Fed. Reg. 44,701, (1994) (recommending such measures to
provide "better and more reliable" notice to property owners).
" United States v. 38 Whalers Cove Drive, 954 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1991) (agreeing
with appellant that the Eighth Amendment attaches when an individual is subject to civil
sanctions classified as punitive), cert. demed, 113 S. Ct. 55 (1992).
" See, e.g., United States v. 508 Depot St., 964 F.2d 814, 816-17 (8th Cir. 1992)
("[W]e believe that the principle of proportionality is a deeply rooted concept in the
common law ... and that 9s a modicum of tfirness, the principle of proportionality
should be applied in civil actions that result in harsh penalties. However, we are
restrained from so holding because of the decisions in prior cases on this issue . . .
" 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2812 (1993).
3See infra notes 29-40 and accompanying text.
'4 See infra notes 41-57 and accompanying text.
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of its applicability to proceeds of criminal activity.! It also discusses the
emerging issue concerning the ability of the courts to mitigate the
severity of forfeitures?6 The main body of the paper reviews the two
primary tests for excessiveness which have emerged from the lower
court 7 and endorses a test based on a combination of the two as best
comporting with the requirements of the Excessive Fines Clause of the
Eighth Amendment.'
L THE EXCESSIE FINES CLAUSE OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
Until Austin was decided, the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth
Amendment lived mainly in the shadow of the Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ments Clause.' Instead of distinguishing between the clauses, courts had
often treated the two as part of a unified attempt by the drafters of the
Constitution to restrain the government's prosecutorial power.' After
Austin, this view is untenable. The Supreme Court has indicated that the
two clauses should be interpreted separately, apparently limiting the
application of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause to cases
concerning the "duration and conditions of confinement" and other
restrictions on liberty more substantial than the payment of fines."
While the standards developed under the many cases applying the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause may be relevant in Excessive Fines
Clause analysis, they are not binding precedent for cases decided under
Austfin 2
2' See infra notes 58-104 and accompanying text.
, See infra notes 266-98 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 105-265 and accompanying text.
2' See infra notes 299-317 and accompanying text.
The Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
30 See Calvin R. Massey, The Excessive Fines Clause and Punitive Damages: Some
Lessons From History, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1233, 1234 (1987). The Excessive Fines Clause
has its origin in the Virginia Declaration of Rights, which mirrors the English Bill of
Rights of 1689. Massey argues that the English Bill applied to a wide range of civil and
criminal fines. Id.
"1 Alexander v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2766, 2775 (1993) (stating that the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause applies only to confinement conditions and not to
criminal forfeiture).
' See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983) (gauging the proportionality of the
punishment to the crime by balancing "(i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of
the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and
(iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions");
United States v. Chandler, 36 F.3d 358, 365 (4th Cir. 1994) (rejecting application of the
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Unlike the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the Excessive
Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment has, until recently, received
virtually no attention from the courts. The Supreme Court did not decide
a case on the Excessive Fines Clause until 1989.' 3 At that time, in
Browning-Ferris Industies v. Kelco Disposal, it acknowledged the
historical understanding that the entire Eighth Amendment applied
"primarily, and perhaps exclusively," to exercises of the government's
prosecutorial power.' Thus, an award of punitive damages in a civil suit
between purely private parties did not trigger the application of the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause.35 Many courts read this decision as
restricting the application of the Excessive Fines Clause to criminal
proceedings, and accordingly they rejected any defense to civil forfeitures
based on Eighth Amendment violations.' The Second Circuit however,
saw the civil forfeiture in some cases as a sufficiently punitive exercise
of government power.37 Therefore, the circuit courts split over whether
the Excessive Fines Clause applied to any actions other than criminal
prosecutions&'
The decision in Ausin answered this question, holding that the Eighth
Amendment limits any government action which imposes a punishment,
regardless of whether the action is characterized as criminal or civil."
Cruel and Unusual PTmishments Clause standard developed in Solem v. Helm in cases
implicating the Excessive Fines Clause), cet. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1792 (1995); Hill v.
State, 868 F. Supp. 221, 225 (M.D. Tenn. 1994) (using Solem); United States v. Shelly's
Riverside Heights, 851 F. Supp. 633, 637 (M.D. Pa. 1994) (using S6lem as a guide);
United States v. 6625 Zumirez Drive, 845 F. Supp. 725, 731 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (rejecting
Solem); see also Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 257, 263 n.3 (1989)
(stating that although the insights are instructive, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause is not controlling).
' See Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. 257.
34 Id. at 262.
35 Id.
I See, e.g., United States v. Plot 20, Lot 17, 960 F.2d 200, 206 (1st Cir. 1992)
(holding that the Eighth Amendment does not apply to civil forfeiture); United States v.
6250 Ledge Rd., 943 F.2d 721, 727 (7th Cir. 1991) (stating that civil forfeiture is
remedial in nature).
31 See United States v. 38 Whalers Cove Drive, 954 F.2d 29, 35 (2d Cir. 1991)
('Torfeitures that are overwhelmingly disproportionate to the value of the offense must be
classified as punishment unless the forfeitures are shown to serve articulated, legitimate
civil purposes.', cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 55 (1992).
3The courts have always assumed that the Excessive Fines Clause applies to
criminal cases. See United States v. 13143 S.W. 15th Lane, 872 F. Supp. 968, 974 n.9
(S.D. Fla. 1994) (reasoning that standards which had once only been applied to criminal
forfeitures could now apply to civil forfeitures).
"Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2806 (1993).
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The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause represents a separate branch
of analysis, perhaps limited to cases involving confinement or similar
conditions, and the Excessive Fines Clause has assumed new importance,
with the threshold question of applicability resting on the distinction
between the punitive or remedial nature of the fine, not the civil or
criminal nature of government action.40
IL TbE DEcIsION IN AUsTN v. UN=D STATEs
The Supreme Court breathed life into the Excessive Fines Clause with
its decision in Austin v. United States!.4' In 1990, Richard L. Austin met
Keith Engebretson at an automobile body shop owned by Austin and
agreed to sell him some cocaine. Austin left the body shop and went to
his adjacent mobile home, returning with two grams of cocaine which he
sold to Engebretson.42 The South Dakota State Police raided the
property the next day and uncovered small amounts of marijuana and
cocaine, a twenty-two caliber revolver, drug paraphernalia, and $4700 in
cash. Austin eventually pled guilty to one count of possession of
cocaine.43
After Austin's indictment, the United States filed a civil forfeiture
action against the body shop and mobile home. Austin answered the
complaint, arguing that the forfeiture would violate the Eighth Amend-
ment, but the district court granted summary judgment for the United
States. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit "reluctantly
agree[d] with the government" and affirmed s The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to resolve the conflict among the circuit courts over the
applicability of the Eighth Amendment to civil forfeiture. 6
The Supreme Court agreed with Austin. The Court first pointed out
that nothing in the text or history of the Eighth Amendment or the
Excessive Fines Clause confines the application of the clause to criminal
cases.4' Rather, the history of the amendment suggests that the drafters
' David Lieber, Eighth Amendment - the Excessive Fines Clause; Austin v. United
States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993), 84 J. CalM. L. 805, 814 (1994) (compring the inclusion
of civil and criminal forfeitures in the Eighth Amendment to specific limitations to the
criminal context in the Fiffl and Sixth Amendments).
41 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
42 Id. at 2803.
43Id.
"4Id.
4' United States v. 508 Depot St., 964 F.2d 814, 817 (8th Cir. 1992).
"Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2804.
4,Id. at 2804-05 (stating that although some provisions have specific limitations, the
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intended it to limit "the Government's power to extract payments, whether
in cash or in kind, 'as punishment for some offense."'" The definition
of punishment does not depend on the classification of an action as
criminal or civil, and any punishment falls within the limits of the
Excessive Fines Clause. If the Court found that a civil forfeiture served
in part to deter and to punish, rather than having a purely remedial
purpose, then the Eighth Amendment would apply.!
To make its determination, the Court reviewed the historical
development of civil forfeiture in England and in the United States. It
stated that the understanding of forfeiture found in early cases and the
early writings of Congress equated forfeitures with fines and viewed both
as punishment.' Nothing in the history of the modem statute in ques-
tion, 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) and (7), contradicted this historical under-
standing of forfeiture as punishment.5 In fact, the presence of express
"innocent owner" defense provisions that allowed owners who did not
know of or consent to the illegal use of their property to retain possession
made the modem statutes more closely resemble punishment, as did the
decision by Congress to tie the forfeiture directly to certain crimes.
Therefore, this section serves at least in part to punish the owner of the
property, and the Excessive Fines Clause applies.O
Having reached this conclusion, the Court declined to establish a test
for determining what qualifies as a constitutionally excessive forfeiture,
believing that "[p]mdence dictates that we allow the lower courts to
consider that question in the first instance."'53 Justice Scalia concurred
in the judgment but had no such reservations about articulating a
constitutional standard. In his opinion, 'The relevant inquiry for an
excessive forfeiture under § 881 is the relationship of the property to the
offense: Was it close enough to render the property, under traditional
standard, 'guilty' and hence forfeitable?" ' Unlike statutes imposing
criminal fines, forfeiture statutes have traditionally determined the
appropriate value of the penalty by reference to what property the
criminal activity has "tainted."'55 Therefore, the value of the seized
Eighth Amendment does not).
4 Id. at 2805 (quoting Browning-FeTris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 257, 265
(1989)).
4 Id. at 2806.




Id. at 2815 (Scalia, ., concuring).
"Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
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property has no relevance, and the inquiry must focus on whether the
seized property has a close enough relationship to the underlying
offense.' The majority did not reject the use of this factor but refused
to adopt it as the sole relevant criterion, leaving the lower courts to
make the first attempt at defining excessiveness in the forfeiture
context.
57
IM THE SCOPE OF THE AUSTIN DECISION
A. To What Statutes Does Austin Apply?
As the Austin decision suggests, current Eighth Amendment analysis
seems to have moved beyond traditional civil/criminal distinctions to one
or more new sets of classifications. After Austin, the difference between
punitive and non-punitive forfeitures, rather than between civil and
criminal ones, defines the scope of the excessiveness inquiry. Austin
almost certainly has implications for a broad range of civil actions,' and
its relevance to a given claim will ultimately depend on the punitive or
remedial nature of the statute in issue.59 The punitive or remedial nature
of the statute depends in turn on the type of property it authorizes for
forfeiture. Below, the Article examines the various categories of forfeit-
able property to determine whether Austin applies to them.
1. Facilitating Property
Austin expressly applied the Excessive Fines Clause to 21 U.S.C.
§ 881(a)(4) and (7), which authorize the forfeiture of vehicles and real
property used to facilitate the commission of a drug offense.' The
5 Id. (Sc"ia, J., concurring).
'7Id. at 2812 n.15.
58 One court has stated that "Austin does not directly or impliedly suggest that either
its holding or statements to the effect that a forfeiture can be an excessive fine under the
Eighth Amendment ame or should be applicable to any actions other than forfeitures under
[those statutory sections specifically mentioned by Austin]." See McNichols v.
Commissioner, 13 F.3d 432, 434 (1st Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. CL 2705 (1994).
This surprising statement was made without support and is probably limited in its
application to tax cases.
59 See infra note 63 and accompanying text.
• 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (1988) provides that the following can be forfeited:
(4) All conveyances, including aircraf vehicles orvessels, which are used, or are
intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation, sale,
receipt, possession or concealment of [controlled substances] ...
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Supreme Court reached this conclusion after examining the historical role
of the Excessive Fines Clause as a restraint on the government's
prosecutorial power and the historical role of forfeiture in this country
and England, and decided that these sections of § 881 served at least in
part to punish and deter the underlying criminal behavior." Therefore,
all actions brought under these two sections must undergo Excessive
Fines Clause scrutiny. Furthermore, it seems that the same analysis would
apply to any forfeiture statute with similar provisions and legislative
purpose. Thus, courts have held that the excessiveness test applicable to
§ 881 applies, as well, to those sections of 18 U.S.C. § 981 which deal
with property used to facilitate currency offenses.' At least one court
has stated that Austin will apply to all punitive forfeitures, without
regard to the specific nature of the underlying crime or the methods used
to accomplish the forfeiture.' Because the facilitating property does
not necessarily represent the profits derived from criminal activity and
does not, in and of itsel, present a threat to society, a seizure of
facilitating property has the potential for excessiveness."s Therefore,
the courts agree that the Constitution requires that such forfeitures be
limited to the amount necessary to achieve legitimate punitive and
remedial goals.65
(7) All real property including any right, title, and interest (including any
leasehold interest) in the whole of any lot or tract of land and any appurtenances or
improvements, which is used or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to
commit, or to facilitate the commission of a violaion ofthis title punishable by more
than one year's imprisonment...
Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2804-08, 2810.
61 See United States v. Taylor, 13 F.3d 786, 790 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding Austin
applicable to a forfeiture of funds under 18 U.S.C. § 981 (1988) and to a forfeiture of
illegal gambling paraphernalia under 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1988)).
63 See Quinones-Ruiz v. United States, 873 F. Supp. 359, 363 (S.D. Cal. 1995)
(applying Austin to an administrative forfeiture of currency and stating that Austin "held
that punitive forfeitures are subject to the Excessive Fines Clause'). State forfeiture
statutes modeled alter their federal counterparts and in court on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988)
claims must also pass muster under the Excessive Fines Clause because, in all probability,
the state's seizure of property used to facilitate the commission of a crime also serves to
punish and deter. See Hill v. State, 868 F. Supp. 221, 224-25 (M.D. Teun. 1994)
(applying Austin to a state statute modeled after 21 U.S.C. § 881).
""A forfeiture [of property which facilitates a crime] may incapacitate the owner
who permits the illegal use, but hardly rids society of a noxious instrumentality." United
States v. 38 Whalers Cove Drive, 747 F. Supp. 173, 180 (E.D.Y. 1990), a'd, 954 F.2d
29 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 55 (1992).
' See, e.g., United States v. Toyfoya, No. CR-93-0505 EFL, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12266, at *17-18 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 1994) (discussing court's duty to tailor forfeiture




The lower courts have adopted a similarly uniform approach to the
seizure of contraband but have reached the opposite conclusion. Courts
have consistently declined to apply the Excessive Fines Clause to such
forfeitures because the goal of removing the offending material from
circulation fully explains the forfeiture and provides the statute with a
purely remedial, as opposed to punitive, purpose." This logic applies as
well to a forfeiture of "derivative contraband" or property essential to the
commission of the underlying offensef When the government removes,
for example, the scales used to measure drugs or the lab equipment used
to manufacture them, it does so because such property creates a danger
to society. No matter what the value of this property, its seizure serves
a purely remedial purpose because it prevents future violations. Therefore,
Austin does not apply.
3. Proceeds of Crminal Act'ty
Austin's applicability to a third type of property, the proceeds of
criminal activity, presents a more difficult question. While not contraband
itselt the property does represent the gain derived from criminal
activities. Its removal provides means whereby the government may
reduce the incentives for crime. Yet one could say the same of most
punishments. And the fact that § 881(a)(6), which provides for the
forfeiture of drug proceeds, also reaches other types of property,
including property intended for use in a crime, has complicated the courts'
approach to the problem.
a. Courts Which Refuse to Apply Austin to Proceeds
The Fifth Circuit first adopted the position that § 881(a)(6) presented
a question different than that posed by the other subsections in a case
"See United States v. Two A-37 Cessna Jets, No. 90-CV-0852E, 1994 U.S. Dist LEXIS
5620, at *8-9 (W.DN.Y. Apr. 19, 1994) (forfeiting jets used to illegally import firearms);
United States v. Proceeds from Approx. 15,1538 (sic) Lobster Tails, 834 F. Supp. 385, 391
(S.D. Fla. 1993) (applying Austin to illegally imported contraband); see also United States v.
Austin, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2811 (1993); infra notes 68-76 and accompanying tex.
In an unpublished opinion, the Ninth Circuit distinished the FCCs seizure of iegal
broadcasting equipinautbecause "a1uho unl whe assets seized inAt'lin, the equiprmet was
the instrumentality ofthe misbehavior, and its seizure prevented future violations:' United States
v. Reveile, No. 93-55433,1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 7179, at *9 (9th Cir. Apr. 5,1994); see also
Cooper v. Greenwood, 904 F.2d 302, 304-05 (5th Cir. 1990) (defining derivative contraband).
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dealing with a double jeopardy claim.' Relying on the Supreme Court
case of United States v. Halper,9 the court felt bound to classify the
forfeiture, whether civil or criminal, as punishment only if the forfeiture
proved so great that it "bore no rational relationship to the costs incurred
by the government and society resulting from the defendant's criminal
conduct."'7 By comparing the value of the proceeds of the illegal drug
sales forfeited in the case to the costs of "detection, investigation, and
prosecution of drug traffickers and reimbursing society for the costs of
combatting the allure of illegal drugs, caring for the victims of the
criminal trade when preventive efforts prove unsuccessful, [and] lost
productivity," the court concluded that forfeitures of proceeds under
§ 881(a)(6) "[serve] the wholly remedial purpose of reimbursing the
government."71 The court went on to contrast this subsection with the
other subsections of 881:
Unlike the real estate forfeiture statute that can result in the confiscation
of the most modest mobile home or the stateliest mansion, the forfeiture
of drug proceeds will always be directly proportional to the amount of
drugs sold. The more drugs sold, the more proceeds that will be
forfeited. As we have held, these proceeds are roughly proportional to
the harm inflicted upon the government and society by the drug sale.
Thus the logic of Austin is inapplicable to § 881(a)(6) - the forfeiture
of drug proceeds.7'
Even without the Halper rational relation test, the court felt that the
confiscation of proceeds could not require Austin analysis. Since the
forfeiture in this case takes away property derived from unlawful
activities, "the forfeiting party loses nothing to which the law ever
entitled him."'7 The court compared the seizure of the drug proceeds to
the repossession of money stolen from a bank. Since the claimant had not
invested "honest labor" in producing the proceeds, she had no reasonable
' United States v. Tilley, 18 F.3d 295, 300 (5th Cir.) (forfeiting proceeds from
illegal drug sales), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 574 (1994). According to United States v.
$405,089.23 in United States Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1219 m8 (9th Cir. 1994), the
answer to "whether a particular forfeiture constitutes punishment will always be the same
for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause and the Eighth Amendment"
490 U.S. 435 (1989).
M 1iley, 18 F.3d at 298-99 (citing Halper, 490 U.S. at 448-49).
7' Id. at 299.




expectation that the law would protect her continued possession.
Therefore, "instead of punishing the forfeiting party, the forfeiture of
illegal proceeds, much like the confiscation of stolen money from a bank
robber, merely places that party in the lawfully protected financial status
quo that he enjoyed prior to launching his illegal scheme."'74 Since this
does not constitute punishment, this case did not implicate the Double
Jeopardy Clause, and by analogy, the Eighth Amendment did not
apply.' The Fifth Circuit clearly only addressed true proceeds in its
arguments, and the opinion did not indicate how the court would treat the
other types of property which § 881(a)(6) covers.76
b. Courts Which Apply Austin to Proceeds
Other courts have rejected these arguments and concluded that the
Excessive Fines Clause does apply to all of § 881(a)(6). The Ninth
Circuit, in another case based on double jeopardy issues, expressly
rejected the Fifth Circuit's reasoning as misapplying the standard
enunciated in Austin." According to the court, "[i]n order to determine
whether a forfeiture constitutes 'punishment' we must look to the entire
scope of the statute which the government seeks to employ, rather than
to the characteristics of the specific property the government seeks to
forfeit."78 For three reasons derived from Austin, the court concluded
that forfeitures under § 881(a)(6) and § 981(a)(1)(A) could qualify as
punishment:
First because of "the historical understanding of forfeiture as pun-
ishment," there is a strong presumption that any forfeiture statute does
not serve solely a remedial purpose. Second, where such a statute
focuses on the culpability of the property owner by exempting innocent
74 Id.
7S Id.
76 In fact, the court read § 881(a)(6) as reaching all funds "involved in a narcotics
transaction in some fashion." $405,089.23, 33 F.3d at 1221. This view clearly comports
with the language of the section, which provides for the forfeiture of
all moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things ofvalue fumished
or intended to be fumished by any person in exchange for a controlled
substance in violation of this title, all proceeds traceable to such an exchange,
and all moneys, negotiable instrunents and securities used or intended to be
used to facilitate a violation of this title ....
7 Id. at 1220.
Id. (citation omitted).
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owners or lien holders, it is likely that the enactment serves at least in
part to deter and punish guilty conduct. Finally, where Congress has tied
forfeiture directly to the commission of specified offenses, it is
reasonable to presume that the forfeiture is at least partially intended as
an additional deterrent to or punishment for those violations of law.79
Furthermore, the court examined the language of 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6)
and 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A) and found them to extend beyond just
property derived from criminal activity." Therefore, under the courts'
analysis, the statutes did provide for punishment, and the Double
Jeopardy Clause operated to bar the separate forfeiture action.
Similarly, the Northern District Court of Illinois opined that "the
critical question is whether forfeitures under § 881(a)(6) can be defined
as solely remedial. 81 Because it read forfeitures under § 881(a)(6) as
stretching beyond merely the proceeds of illegal activity, the court felt
that the section did not serve a purely remedial purpose. ' A forfeiture
of money the owner intends to use to purchase drugs or property to
facilitate a drug offense will, in the court's view, serve in part to punish
the owner. Such a forfeiture thus falls under the protection of Ausin and
the Excessive Fines Clause. However, after examining the forfeiture in
question, the court concluded that it did not violate the Eighth Amend-
ment as it did not qualify as grossly disproportionate.'
The courts all seem to acknowledge that the application of Austin
depends on the punitive nature of the statute, but while some turn to the
purpose of the statute or the section as a whole to make their evaluation,
others focus on the specific character of the property involved. In large
part, the dilemma could be solved by applying Austin and the Excessive
Fines Clause to the statutes in their entirety. While this approach would
provide constitutional protection to all the property described by the
statutes, courts could easily conclude that the seizure of criminally
9 Id. at 1221.
so See supra note 76 (providing relevant portions of 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6)). 18
U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A) provides for forfeiture of property as a result of a racketeering
conviction.
" United States v. 4204 Thordle Ave., No. 92C-3744, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17415, at *27 (N.D. Mll. Nov. 23, 1994) (condoning forfeiture of drug sale proceeds).
RId.
"Id. at 29. Additionally, different panels of the Fourth Circi have disagreed over
whether the Excessive Fines Clause applies to proceeds, so the law in that circuit remains
unsettled. See United States v. Shifflet, No. 94-5287, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 5949, at *8
n.2 (4th Cir. Mar. 23, 1995) (discussing which of several conflicting decisions to follow
in a case where a man's truck is forfeited due to his son's drug dealing).
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derived property or proceeds did not violate their chosen excessiveness
test. Because proceeds represent the fruit of illegal activity, the property
and the crime share a strong nexus. Furthermore, since greater amounts
of proceeds almost necessarily result from greater amounts of criminal
activity, rough proportionality will always exist. This approach avoids an
unduly narrow reading of the sections, allowing courts to continue to
characterize the entire statutes as punitive and removing the need to resort
to comparison with the societal costs of illegal drug activity and other
crimes to justify the remedial label As more courts address the issue,
a consensus may emerge around this or another approach. However,
two circuits have already disagreed, making this one of the more clearly
defined areas of controversy under Austin. Given the government's
expressed intention to concentrate its forfeiture strategy on proceeds,
which it views as exempt from constitutional review,' this is one of the
most important issues.
B. Does the Criminal/Civil Distinction Matter?
As these cases illustrate, the distinction between criminal and civil
forfeiture appears less important for Eighth Amendment analysis than the
distinction between punitive and remedial purposes." Few cases have
discussed the remaining significance, if any, of the criminal/civil
distinction, and the Supreme Court has provided little guidance in this
area. In Alexander v. United States, decided at the same time as Austin,
the Court held that the Excessive Fines Clause limits criminal forfeiture
under the Racketeer Influenced and Cornupt Organizations Act ("RICO'),
just as it does civil forfeitures.' The Court did not elaborate on the
standards to apply and referred instead to Austin and its express refusal
to formulate a test for excessiveness.' This position left the lower courts
to decide whether to apply the same excessiveness test to both criminal
and civil forfeitures or to develop two separate definitions.
- See Forfeiture Manual Signals Help for Fictims, 3 No. 11 DOJ ALERT (Sept. 6-20,
1993) (indicating that the Department of Justice will argue that forfeitures serve the
remedial purpose of reimbursing society for the costs of detecting and preventing criminal
activty).
gs Id.
11 See, e.g., United States v. 6380 Little Canyon Rd., No. 93-15982, 1995 WL
408578, at *6 (9th Cir. July 12, 1995) (noting the reduced importance of the distinction).
28 U.S.C. § 524 (1988).
" 113 S. Ct. 2766, 2776 (1993).
, Id. at 2775-76.
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1. Courts Diwnguishing Ciminal and Civil
The courts which have addressed this issue directly have taken
opposite approaches. In a criminal forfeiture case, the Northern District
Court of California concluded that "[d]espite Alexander's reference to
Austin, in the [c]ourt's opinion, the analysis for criminal forfeiture differs
from the proportionality determination made in civil forfeiture cases."'
The court apparently relied on Justice Scalia's statement in Austin that
while the legitimacy of civil forfeitures should depend on the nexus
between the property and the crime, rather than its value, "in the case of
monetary fines and criminal in personam forfeitures 'the touchstone is the
value of the fine in relation to the offense."'" The court then went on
to adopt a proportionality test derived from the factors enunciated in
Solem v. Helm,93 a Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause case. As the
court acknowledged, other circuits have applied the Solem factors in
the same manner to civil forfeitures,95 but the Toyfoya court apparently
felt bound to adopt the Scalia test in the civil arena, while fashioning a
more value-based test for criminal cases.
The Fourth Circuit also decided that the determination of excessive-
ness should differ based on the nature of the case and distinguished its
earlier adoption of an instrumentality test as applying only to civil
forfeitures.96 It viewed a criminal forfeiture as the functional equivalent
of a fine, and "[b]ecause an in personam criminal forfeiture is a form of
monetary punishment assessed against a criminal defendant for the
commission of some offense, it is clear that the excessiveness inquiry
should focus, at least in part, on the value of the property being forfeited,
21 U.S.C. § 853 (1988) (defining criminal forfeiture).
91 United States v. Toyfoya, No. CR-93-0505 EFL, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12266,
at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 1994). This conclusion might be changed in the wake of United
States v. 6380 Little Canyon Rd, No. 93-15982, 1995 WL 408578 (9th Cir. July 12,
1995), cited supra in note 86.
1 Id. at *4 (quoting Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2815 (1993) (Scalia,
., concurring)).
463 U.S. 277 (1983) (considering the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of
the Eighth Amendment).
Toyfoya, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEX=S 12266, at *5-6.
See, e.g., United States v. Shelly's Riverside Heights, 851 F. Supp. 633, 637 (M.D.
Pa. 1994) (holding that civil forfeiture of a log cabin and other property was excessive
in relation to the seriousness of the offense of marijuana cultivation).
' United States v. Wild, 47 F.3d 669, 673-74 (4th ,Cir. 1995) (vacating criminal
forfeiture of a house in a drug case and remanding the case for trial to determine whother
the forfeiture was excessive under the proportionality test).
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i.e., the amount of the fine." Therefore, different considerations
applied to the two types of cases.
2. Courts Treating Criminal and Civil the Same
In contrast, the Southern District Court of Indiana felt no need to
make a criminal/civil distinction in a civil forfeiture case brought under
§ 881(a)(7). In fact, it relied on dicta in a pre-Austin case which noted
that "if this court were to treat civil forfeitures in the same manner as
criminal forfeitures [as the court feels that Austin mandates], then the
same rules would govern both types of forfeitures," 8 for guidance in
formulating a test. The court then mentioned factors relevant in the
criminal context and described how they could easily be adapted to fit
civil cases. For instance, instead of the harm caused by the claimant's
conduct, "the court might instead evaluate the harm caused by the
conduct associated with the property, or the harm directly caused by the
property, subject to forfeiture. Similarly, instead of evaluating the
claimant's 'motive in committing the crime' the Eighth Amendment
analysis would be better served if the court looked at the claimant's
motive in allowing the use of his property for the alleged criminal
activities... ."- The court did not apply this test, considering a motion
to dismiss an inappropriate occasion, but simply reaffirmed its intention
to treat both types of cases under the same rules."° A District Court in
Florida also indicated that the two types of cases should receive similar
treatment, saying that "since the Supreme Court has held that the
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment applies to civil as well
as criminal cases, the grossly disproportionate standard should likewise
apply to civil cases.'' °
While the Indiana court felt compelled by earlier dicta to apply the
same factors to criminal and civil forfeitures, common sense also supports
the view that the Excessive Fines Clause analysis should be the same for
both types of cases, especially given that the threshold applicability test
7 Id. at 674.
' United States v. Five Acres, No. IP-93-609-C, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20102, at
*50 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 22, 1993) (quoting United States v. 6250 Ledge Rd., 943 F.2d 721,
728 (7th Cir. 1991)).
19 Id. at *51-52.
"0 Id. at *53.
101 United States v. 13143 S.W. 15th Lane, 872 F. Supp. 968, 974 n.9 (S.D. Fla.
1994) (ordering forfeiture of home due to drug conviction despite Eighth Amendment and
Double Jeopardy Clause challenges).
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applies without regard to the civil or criminal nature of the action. While
the presence of a criminal conviction may certainly weigh more or less
heavily in the Excessive Fines Clause analysis, criminal forfeitures are
not necessarily more amenable to standards imported from the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause than their civil counterparts, and criminal
forfeitures present no unique problems which would require the courts to
fashion two entirely separate tests for the application of one clause.
Actually, many tests applied in civil cases expressly acknowledge the
possible presence of a criminal conviction and allow for that in their
balance of factors." 2 This sort of accommodation seems more apt to
encourage clarity and uniformity instead of allowing two separate lines
of cases to develop under the one clause.
C. RetroactiMty
Finally, the courts have yet to settle the extent of Autain's retroactive
applicability. In an unpublished opinion, the Ninth Circuit has expressly
held Austin applicable to "cases not yet final on June 28, 1993."" In
so doing, it relied on a number of opinions which had seemed to indicate
a willingness to go at least this far in applying the decision retroactively
but had never reached the precise question. For instance, the Third Circuit
did not reach the question of whether Austin applied to cases not yet final
at the time that the Supreme Court reached its decision, but it noted a
"trend in that direction."
1 4
IV. TESTS FOR EXCESSIVENESS
A. Introduction
When it declined to establish a "multi-factor test for determin-
ing whether a forfeiture is constitutionally 'excessive, '" 05 the Supreme
Court guaranteed that it would have a wide variety of options from which
to select when it finally chooses to revisit the issue. Because only one
, See W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Conviction or Acquittal as Evdence of the Facts
on Which It Was Based in CMi Action, 18 A.L.R.2D 1287, 1299-1307 (1951).
" United States v. 25445 Via Dona Christa, No. 93-55797, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS
35465, at *2 (9th Cir. Dec. 9, 1994) (ordering forfeiture of home where narcotics and
paraphernalia were sold).
" United States v. Rural Route No. 1, Box 224, 14 F.3d 864, 873 n.9 (3d Cir. 1994)
(allowing civil forfeiture of real property used to facilitate the distribution of cocaine).
'' Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2812 (1993).
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circuit had applied the Eighth Amendment to civil forfeitures prior to
Austin,'" most courts started from scratch and designed a test drawn
from a wide variety of sources. Occasionally, circuits remanded cases to
the district courts with only the broadest guidelines as to the test the
lower courts should use;. 7 many circuits considered a number of
different tests before settling on a relatively stable formulation.0 8 After
the field cleared, two contenders emerged. A number of courts relied
heavily on Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in Austin and adopted an
"instrumentality" test, so named because it focuses on the use of the
property in the commission of the illegal act and suggests a return to the
guilty property fiction upon which courts had historically rested their
forfeiture decisions. Under this test, if the property in question has a
sufficient connection to the crime so as to render it guilty by traditional
standards, then the forfeiture does not violate the Excessive Fines Clause.
If only a fortuitous or incidental connection exists between the property
and the underlying crime, then the forfeiture cannot stand. A number of
courts have adopted either a pure version of this test, or a version which
considers other factors but strongly emphasizes instrumentality analysis.
Perhaps an equal number of courts have rejected the Scalia approach,
turning instead to a footnote in the majority opinion of Austin which
indicated that the Court, while "not rul[ing] out the possibility that the
connection between the property and the offense may be relevant, in no
way limits the Court of Appeals from considering other factors in
determining whether the forfeiture ... was excessive."'" These courts
adopted the primary alternative to the instrumentality test, which has
come to be called proportionality analysis. While proportionality tests
appear less uniform than their instrumentality counterparts and tend to
involve many more factors, they all have as their core a comparison of
" See United States v. 38 Whalers Cove Drive, 954 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1991) (rejecting
claim that forfeiture of condominium in a drug case was a violation of Eighth Amend-
ment), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 55 (1992).
107 See Rural Route No. 1, Box 224, 14 F.3d at 875 (listing factors but not establishing
a test).
" The Fourth Circuit decided a series of cases using a variety of tests, culminating
in its adoption of the insirmentality test in United States v. Chandler, 36 F.3d 358 (4th
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1792 (1995). See United States v. Borromeo, 1 F.3d
219, 221 (4th Cir. 1993) (affirming civil forfeiture of curency allegedly conected to
drug activity); United States v. Stewart, No. 93-1642, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 5239, at
*10 (4th Cir. Feb. 7, 1994) (remanding forfeiture of real and personal property to
determine whether a substantial connection existed between seized assets and criminal
activity).
9 Austin, 113 S. CL at 2812 n.15.
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the severity of the forfeiture to the seriousness of the crime. Although the
government has indicated that it will continue to argue that civil
forfeitures under § 881 do not exceed constitutional limits unless
disproportionate to the overall societal effects of the drug trade,"0 most
courts have taken an approach that evaluates the claimant's specific
behavior and looks at circumstances unique to the claimant's case, such
as the extent of his criminal involvement, the type of the crime, and the
claimant's financial status. In many cases, the judgment concerning the
severity of the penalty depends upon the value of the property forfeited,
although other factors may influence the decision. Additionally, many
courts have transplanted proportionality factors found under the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause into the civil forfeiture cases, with varying
degrees of modification."' While these courts generally do not totally
disregard the connection between the property and the illegal activity,
their approach differs from the instrumentality approach in that they stress
the value of the property, a factor which has no significance under
Scalia's instrumentality test.
A few courts have chosen to split the difference and apply both
instrumentality and proportionality analyses in a two-step process."
Under this hybrid approach, neither consideration receives greater weight,
and the forfeiture must pass both tests to survive constitutional analysis.
Finally; at least two courts have adopted approaches which seem unique
in that they adopt neither a clear instrumentality nor a clear proportionali-
ty approach, but instead impose a test derived from an entirely different
source."' While interesting, these cases are notable only for their
unusualness, and it is the instrumentality and the more amorphous
proportionality tests which dominate excessive fines jurisprudence.
B. The Instrumentality Approach
1. Scalia's Concurrence - The Birth of the Test
Unlike his colleagues in the majority, Justice Scalia did not agree that
prudence dictated that the lower courts attempt to formulate a test without
guidance. In his Austin concurrence, Scalia suggested "that the sole
measure of an in rem forfeiture's excessiveness is the relationship between
"0 See Forfeiture Manual Signals Help for Victims, supra note 84.
nt See infra notes 173-204 and accompanying text.
m See infra notes 205-57 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 258-65 and accompanying text.
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the forfeited property and the offense."" 4 He argued that while the
constitutionality of monetary fines and perhaps in personam forfeitures
depends upon the value of the fine in relation to the offense, statutory in
rem forfeitures have not rested on an assessment of the appropriate value
of the penalty but rather on what property the illicit activity had
"tainted.". 5 Justice Scalia suggested looking not at the value of the
forfeited property in relation to the predicate crime, but rather to the
closeness of the relationship between the two. Scalia stated:
Scales used to measure out unlawful drug sales, for example, are
confiscable whether made of the purest gold or the basest metal. But an
in rem forfeiture goes beyond the traditional limits that the Eighth
Amendment permits if it applies to property that cannot properly be
regarded as an instrumentality of the offense - the building, for
example, in which an isolated drug sale happens to occur. Such a
confiscation would be an excessive fine. The question is not how much
the property is worth, but whether the confiscated property has a close
enough relationship to the offense."
6
Thus, "the relevant inquiry for an excessive forfeiture under § 881 is the
relationship of the property to the offense: Was it close enough to render
the property, under traditional standards 'guilty' and, hence, forfeit-
able?",
2. Courts Applying the Instrumentality Tests
a. The Fourth Circuit
Once again, the majority in Austin did not discount the importance of
the connection between the property and the crime but merely refused to
characterize it as the sole factor. However, at least two courts have
followed Scalia's lead and have adopted a "pure" instrumentality test. In
United States v. Chandler, a case brought under § 881(a)(6) and (7), the
Fourth Circuit rejected its earlier proportionality analysis in favor of a
"three-part instrumentality test that considers (1) the nexus between the
offense and the property and the extent of the property's role in the
offense, (2) the role and culpability of the owner, and (3) the possibility
114 Austin, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2812 n.15 (1993).
15 Id. at 2815 (Scalia, L, concuning).
116 Id. (Scalia, J., concuring).
117 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
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of separating offending property that can readily be separated from the
remainder.... The court adopted this approach after reviewing the
congressional purpose behind the forfeiture statute. In the court's view,
Congress had no intention of imposing punishment of a particular value
but intended to punish the owner by seizing whatever property had been
tainted by the illegal activity, regardless of value. "Accordingly, the
constitutional limitation on the government's action must be applied to the
degree and the extent of the taint, and not to the value of the property or
the gravity of the offense.' ' .
While concentrating on the use of the property itselt the court also
acknowledged that forfeiture in reality punishes the owner. Therefore, the
courts must also consider the extent of the owner's culpability when
reviewing excessiveness. If the owner has only an incidental involvement
in the underlying offense, then this factor will weigh in favor of
excessiveness. Finally, the court noted that an otherwise excessive
forfeiture could survive if the court could easily separate the offending
property from the entire parcel that the government seeks to seize.'
Therefore, the court must also consider its ability to mitigate forfeitures
to make them conform to constitutional standards.
Perhaps because it had earlier seemed to endorse a proportionality
analysis,' the Fourth Circuit went on to explain why it now rejected
proportionality in the civil forfeiture context. It noted that most propor-
tionality courts had based their decisions on a review of the three factors
derived from Solem v. Helm:' The inherent gravity of the offense, the
sentences imposed for similarly grave offenses in the same jurisdiction,
and sentences imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions.' 3
However, the court noted that the recent decision of Harmelin v.
Michigan' had called the validity of Solem into question, with perhaps
a majority of the Justices rejecting the notion that the Eighth Amendment
includes a strict proportionality requirement.' Additionally, the Solem
"1 36 F.3d 358, 365 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1792 (1995).
9 Id. at 364.
"id.
"'See United States v. Boromeo, 1 F.3d 219, 221 (4th Cir. 1993) ("[TITe
proportional relationship of the value of the proceeds to the harm occasioned by a
defendant's criminal conduct may, in a given case, be relevant under the Supreme Court's
approach in Austin.:).
" 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
" United States v. Chandler, 36 F.3d 358, 365 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Solem v. Helm,
463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983)), cert. denied, 115 S. CL 1792 (1995).
1 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
" Chandler, 36 F.3d at 365.
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test derives from the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, not the
Excessive Fines Clause, and it may not be relevant to Excessive Fines
Clause analysis.'6
After rejecting the proportionality principle, the court went on to
apply its test to the facts. Chandler's house and thirty-three acre farm had
served as the site of over 130 drug transactions, and was an important
instrument of drug activity.' In fact, it had been modified to facilitate
the drug operation which permeated the entire structure. Chandler himself
actively participated in the drug activity.' Chandler failed to provide
evidence that a court could separate the property, but as the court held
forfeiture of the entire property constitutional, ability to mitigate did not
influence the decision.'" The court applied its multi-factor analysis and
reached its decision on excessiveness without inquiry into the value of the
property involved. Under this test, "[n]o one factor is dispositive but, to
sustain a forfeiture against an Eighth Amendment challenge, the court
must be able to conclude, under the totality of circumstances, that the
property was a substantial and meaningful instrumentality in the
commission of the offense, or would have been had the offensive conduct
been carried out as intended."'"
b. The Eastern District of Wisconsin
The Eastern District Court of Wisconsin likewise adopted a pure
instrumentality test, with far less analysis or discussion in United States
v. 2828 N 54th Street, an action brought pursuant to § 881(a)(7).' 3' In
deciding for the government on a motion for summary judgment, the
judge merely stated that he found "that the forfeiture of [the claim-
ant's] right, title and interest in the defendant real property does not
constitute an excessive fine in violation of the Eighth Amendment
because he had established a substantial drug manufacturing operation at
that property."'" While this statement surely represents the instrumen-
tality test, the court did not offer any rationale for its choice of stan-
dards.
' Id. at 365-66.
, Id. at 366.
"Id.
'Id.
-o Id. at 365.
-1 829 F. Supp. 1071, 1072-73 (E.D. Wis. 1993).
m Id. at 1073.
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c. The Middle District of Alabama
In addition to the two courts adopting a pure instrumentality test
a few have turned to hybrid approaches emphasizing the nexus between
the property and the illicit act while also including factors found in many
proportionality tests. For instance, the Middle District Court of Alabama
originally adopted a pure instrumentality approach, but after an Eleventh
Circuit case suggested that courts should engage in some form of
proportionality review, the court applied a "two step balancing test which
emphasizes 'instrumentality' analysis but includes 'proportionality."' I
In the original decision of United States v. 427 & 429 Hall Street, the
court found probable cause to believe that the claimant did not qualify as
an innocent owner and determined that the forfeiture did not violate the
Eighth Amendment under the instrumentality test.35 However, on
rehearing, the court felt bound to reevaluate its Excessive Fines Clause
determination after a decision by the Eleventh Circuit, which did not
articulate a clear test but seemed to suggest that the court should
undertake a proportionality evaluation."
In reviewing its decision, the court rejected any test which depended
heavily on the notion of disproportionality because "[i]t is an extremely
subjective test and thereby easily manipulated to produce desired
results."137 According to this court, the fault with the test lies in its
failure to provide guidance for future decisions:
This approach makes paramount the personal, subjective feelings of the
individual judge as to simply "what seems right" on a case by case basis,
rather than giving objective guidance to courts in an effort to achieve
consistent application of the law. Moreover, the application of the test
produces a significant increase in the burden placed upon the Government
within forfeiture cases and thereby changes the substance of forfeiture law
as enacted by Congress. Austin does not justify such a result."3
1 See United States v. Chandler, 36 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 1792 (1995) and United States v. 2828 N. 54th St., 829 F. Stpp. 1071 (E.D. Wris.
1993).
' United States v. 427 & 429 Hall St., 853 F. Supp. 1389, 1399 (M.D. Ala. 1994)
(denying motion for new trial following the decision in United States v. 427 & 429 Hall
St., 842 F. Supp. 1421 (M.D. Ala. 1994)).
"s United States v. 427 & 429 Hall St., 842 F. Supp. 1421, 1424-26 (M.D. Ala.
1994).
"' See United States v. 18755 N. Bay Rd., 13 F.3d 1493 (11th Cir. 1994).
"7 427 & 429 Hall St., 853 F. Supp. at 1398.
"3 Id. at 1398-99.
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Thus, the court adopted a test focusing on instrumentality yet includ-
ing additional steps. First, the fact finder must decide if a "substantial
connection"' between the predicate crime and defendant property exists.
If so, then the fact finder must determine whether the forfeiture consti-
tutes a "grossly disproportionate" punishment, given the nature of the
predicate crime. 39 The first step examines the relationship between the
property and the offense, with the government having the burden of
establishing the substantial connection by showing a pattern of illegal
activities occurring at the defendant property."4 If it does so successful-
ly, then a presumption in favor of forfeiture arises, and the burden shills
to the claimant, giving even those who cannot establish an innocent
owner defense an opportunity to defeat the forfeiture. 4' At this stage,
a court must balance the value of the property against the scope of the
predicate crime. In the case of drug trafficking, the court should consider
"the amount of drugs involved, their value, the length of time over which
drug trafficking occurred, and the effect of the distribution on individuals
and the community.""4 The court should not, however, consider the
claimant's culpability as a relevant factor. By the time the court reaches
the constitutional issue, the government would have already met its
burden of proving the property subject to forfeiture, and any innocent
owner defense necessarily would have failed. Therefore, the claimant's
culpability would no longer be in doubt."
After applying this test, the court concluded that
the forfeiture of this property valued at $60-65,000 is not grossly
disproportionate to the sale of cocaine on two separate occasions and
the possession of cocaine on another occasion with intent to sell it,
where the cocaine totaled approximately [four] grams and the trafficking
occurred in an apparently legitimate grocery store located within one-
tenth mile of the basketball courts of a junior high school.'"
While one could argue that reliance on gross disproportionality raises the
same subjectivity concerns that the court sought to avoid, the court points
out that it has struck a balance in determining excessiveness. "Requiring
proof of gross -disproportion against a presumption favoring forfeiture
39' Id. at 1399."DoId.
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provides an escape valve for obvious injustices and at the same time
should promote consistency in the application of the law.' 1 Whether
this proves true or not, the court managed to preserve its instrumentality
inclinations in the face of arguably contrary direction from the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals.
di The Central District of California
The Central District Court of California also chose to focus on the
connection between the property and the underlying crime.'" When
both parties moved for summary judgment, the court applied a "multi-
factor test that focuses on an evaluation of the relationship of the property
to the alleged offense, rather than an analysis of the property's actual
monetary value." 47 Before developing its own test, the court rejected
the Cruel and Unusual Punishment analysis of Solem. m The court first
noted that "[a]s a practical matter, it is impossible to meaningfully
compare the value of property subject to a civil forfeiture based on a
criminal act with the possible criminal penalty for that act imposed in
the same and other jurisdictions,' two comparisons which the Solem
analysis requires. Especially in this case, where use of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines for comparison would require the court to calculate
a sentence for a crime for which the owner had been acquitted, such an
approach offers neither logical consistency nor much utility. Furthermore,
this method would result in a misuse of the criminal penalties, as
Congress intended both the civil and criminal statutes to discourage drug
145 Id. at 1400.
'4 United States v. 6625 Zumirez Drive, 845 F. Supp. 725, 734-35, 737 (C.D. Cal.
1994).
A recent Ninth Circuit case, United States v. 6380 Little Canyon Rd., No. 93-15982,
1995 WL 408578 (9th Cir. July 12, 1995), has reduced the importance of the Zumirez
decision. However, the case remains one of the most frequetly cited on this issue, and
several other courts have adopted its test outright Thus it remains an important case for
analytical purposes.
In Zumirez, the government seized a house in which police had found cocaine valued
at around $15,200. A state court acquitted the owner of the house of any involvement in
distributing the cocaine, so the government based its forfeiture on the fact that the owner
had allowed his son to use the property for illicit purposes and on allegedly false
statements made by the owner to a loan officer which were discovered when the
government deposed the owner about the drug offense. Id. at 737.42.
7 Id. at 732.
'48 Id. at 731.
149 Id. at 732.
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trafficking, and "[o]ne is not intended to mitigate the effects of the
other." 15
Instead, the court chose to weigh three factors, treating none of the
three as dispositive. "The first of these factors, the inherent gravity of the
offense compared with the harshness of the penalty, emanates from Solem
v. Helm, but is appropriately applied in the Excessive Fines context. 1 51
The court then must undertake a detailed analysis of this first inquiry,
adopting a somewhat novel approach to determining the gravity of the
offense. Because
[p]Mrobable cause for a civil forfeiture is comparatively easy for the
government to establish and it may seek to forfeit property linked with
criminal activity under circumstances where (1) the claimant has been
convicted of the criminal act or acts underlying the forfeiture; [or] (2)
the claimant has never been charged with any crime; [or] (3) the
claimant has been charged and acquitted of the act or acts underlying
the forfeiture1
52
the first inquiry considers the claimant's conduct, "the gravity of which
decreases in each of the three situations.' '5  A claimant who has been
acquitted "cannot be treated 'as if' he had committed that offense for
purposes of evaluating the gravity of his conduct:"' Additionally,
whenever the claimant's conduct falls into the second or third category,
the court must examine only the gravity of the conduct in which the
claimant himself has engaged, rather than the gravity of the offenses
probably committed on the property.155 Next, the court must turn to the
harshness of the penalty imposed. In this evaluation, "the court must not
only consider the monetary value of the property forfeited, but also the
intangible value of the particular type of property involved."' Thus a
forfeiture of real property usually imposes a greater sanction than the
forfeiture of personal property of equal value, especially if it implicates
the "sanctity of the home.""
150 Id.
1 Id. (citations omitted).




15 Id. at 734.
1 Id.
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Although Zumirez is usually seen as emphasizing instrumentality
concerns because its second and third steps focus on the use of the
property, the second factor received far less discussion than the harshness
analysis." The court phrased the second relevant question as whether
"the property was an integral part of the commission of the crime."'"
This statement echoes Justice Scalia's traditional guilty property test.
Lastly, the court chose to give separate emphasis to "whether the criminal
activity involving the defendant property was extensive in terms of time
or spatial use,"'" a question also often considered under a pure instru-
mentality test. This examination asks if the defendant property played an
extensive or pervasive role in the commission of the crime, and "is like
the second factor except that the inquiry is quantitative rather than
qualitative.9'
6'
In concluding its discussion, the Zumirez court noted the exceptional
need for constitutional protection in the forfeiture context, where the
government stands to profit from the outcome of the case. It then
endorsed its own test as giving "renewed significance to the Eighth
Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause and [having] the added benefit of
checking the government's potential for abusive use of the civil forfeiture
statutes."'" After applying the test, the court acknowledged that the
owner did permit illegal conduct on his property, but since the house
provided "nothing more than a place at which drugs were sold" for an
undefined period of time, the forfeiture of property involving $625,000
in equity violated the Excessive Fines Clause.
e. Other Courts Applying the Zumirez Test
Other courts have frequently cited the Zumirez case,'" and at least
two have adopted its test outright. The Northern District Court of Illinois
adopted the Zumirez instrumentality test after reviewing cases decided
before and after Austin, but it appeared to shift the focus slightly toward







161 United States v. 1215 Kelly Rd., 860 F. Supp. 764, 766 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
162 Zumfrez, 845 F. Supp. at 735.
13 Id. at 738.
164 See, e.g., United States v. 9638 Chicago Heights, 27 F.3d 327, 331 (8th Cir. 1994);
Quinones-Ruiz v. United States, 873 F. Supp. 359, 364 (S.D. Cal. 1995).
6 United States v. Rural Route No. 1, Mound Rd., No. 90-C-4722, 1994 U.S. DisL
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§ 881(a)(7), but the claimant also stood convicted of ten counts of using
a telephone to commit a felony.1" Apparently these phone calls to
arrange drug transactions which were made from the defendant property
represented the only link between the property and the offense. The court
decided that "[w]hile this telephonic link is not overwhelming, we cannot
say that it is so tenuous as to render forfeiture excessive as a matter of
law."'" The court then noted that it would reconsider the excessive
fines issue should the facts develop differently than expected.1" The
Western District Court of Washington also found the Zumirez court's test
persuasive and adopted it with almost no discussion in a memorandum
opinion.
169
3. Commentary on the Instrumentality Test
The instrumentality test has also found some support among commen-
tators, at least as a threshold inquiry, largely because of its perceived
ability to control judicial subjectivity. In one legal publication's survey of
leading cases, an author noted that "[t]he dangers of judicial subjectivity,
which provide the foundation for Justice Scalia's impulse to restrict
judicial discretion, lend substantial support to the imposition of an
instrumentality test.' 70 Theoretically, this test will limit subjectivity by
removing the need to consider the magnitude of the claimant's culpability.
When combined with a "secondary" proportionality test, this threshold
inquiry should eliminate the most questionable cases, leaving the judiciary
to weigh the seriousness of the offense only after an initial determination
in favor of constitutionality.'
The instrumentality approaches proposed present a fairly uniform
body of law in that they all place paramount importance on the role of
the property in the underlying offense. Under these tests, a forfeiture
violates the Excessive Fines Clause unless the forfeited property has a
substantial connection to the criminal activity. To meet this standard, the
property must have played an integral role in the offense, a determination
usually made by looking at the spatial and temporal extent of its use.
LEXIS 6433, at *8-11 (N.D. l. May 16, 1994).
'"21 U.S.C. § 843 (1988 & Supp. 1993).
" Rural Route No. 1, Mound Rd, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6433, at *8.
'"Id. at *11.
'"United States v. 1215 Kelly Rd., 860 F. Supp. 764, 766 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
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Because this test limits a court's inquiry to the facts surrounding the propertyt
connection with the crime, it would, in theory, reduce judicial discretion and
lead to greater uniformity in this area of the law.
C. The Proportionality Approach
Proportionality analysis, so named because it compares the harshness of
the punishment (the forfeiture) to the seriousness of the underlying crime,
presents the primary alternative to the instrumentality approach As previously
noted, many of the cases adopting the proportionality view base their inquiry
on the Crel and Unusual Punishments Clause analysis found in Solem v.
Helm." However, these cases also include a wide variety of other factors
and resemble a "totality of the circumstances" test that is broader than the
Scalia standard. Generally, the proportionality approach differs from the
instrumentality approach in that it places greater emphasis on the value of the
property seized and less on the nexus between it and the underlying crime.
1. Courts Applying Proportionality Review
a. The Eleventh Orcuit
Although the Eleventh Circuit has not explicitly spelled out its test, most
other courts, including the district courts in the Eleventh Circuit read the
opinion in United States v. 18755 North Bay Road'73 as imposing a
proportionality requirement. 74 In that case, the government seized the home
of Emilio and Yolanda Delo, an older couple, under a statute providing for
the forfeiture of property used in an illegal gambling operation. 5 The court
concluded that forfeiture of a home arguably valued at $150,000 imposed a
disproportionate penalty. The court noted that the legislative history of the
statute indicated that Congress intended to reach large gambling syndicates,
rather than illicit gambling which appears "sporadic or of insignificant
monetary proportions"'7 6 Therefore, although the house facilitated the
- 463 U.S. 277 (1983). Although the decision in Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957
(1991), effectively overruled olem inthe area of cruel and unusualpunishment analysis, courts
have not hesitated to use it as a starting point for their excessive fines analysis. For instance, the
Third Circuit has noted the effect of Harmelin on Solem, but distinguished it as interpreting the
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause rather than tho Excessive Fines Clause, and continued
to utilize the Solem factors in its proportionality cases. United States v. Rural Route No. 1, Box
224, 14 F.3d 864, 874 n.10 (3d Cir. 1994).
1 13 F.3d 1493 (l1th Cir. 1994).
'7 See, e.g., United States v. 427 & 429 Hall St., 853 F. Supp. 1389, 1398 (M.D. Ala.
1994); United States v. 13143 S.W. 15th Lane, 872 F. Supp. 968, 973 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
1-' 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1988).
'76 18755 N. Bay Rd, 13 F.3d at 1498.
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Delios' illegal card games, the insignificance of the card games argued
against the forfeiture of such a valuable piece of property.1"
b. The Middle District of Pennsylvania
The court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania employed a more
clearly defined proportionality test to invalidate a forfeiture under
§ 881(a)(6) and (7) in United States v. Shelly's Riverside Heights."
Drawing on a Third Circuit case which refused to establish a test but
offered some guidelines, 79 the court applied a modified Solem analy-
sis.80 When the government challenged this application, the court ac-
knowledged that subsequent decisions had cast doubt on the validity of
the Solem factors. However, the court distinguished these latter decisions
as applying to the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause and pointed out
that Scalia, one of Solem'sprimary detractors, indicated that the Excessive
Fines Clause may raise different issues. Thus, the court concluded that "a
proportionality analysis under Solem may still have continuing validity on
whether a fine is excessive under the Eighth Amendment.''.
In applying its test, the court first noted that the owner of the cabin
and land in question, Tab Deaner, had in his possession a relatively small
amount of marijuana and that the government had failed to supply any
proof of intent to distribute. "Further, while the Government seeks to
seize a parcel of land of approximately ten acres, the evidence suggests
that the illegal activity was entirely confined to the cabin, which sits on
one small portion of that large tract of land."'" The court also took
notice of the fact that the judge in Deaner's criminal case had not
imposed a fine, believing that Deaner lacked the ability to pay. Turning
to the Solem factors, the court acknowledged the seriousness of the crime
but opined that "[i]n the realm of drug offenses, however, [Deaner's] was
not a crime of tremendous gravity,'. 3 as the activity did not extend
beyond the cabin itself and provided Deaner with no other benefit than
a ready supply of marijuana. As the cabin and the land appeared to be the
'77 Id. at 1498-99.
'- 859 F. Supp. 150, 152-54 (M.D. Pa. 1994) (denying the Government's motion for
reconsideration of United States v. Shelly's Riverside Heights, 851 F. Supp. 633 (M.D. Pa.
1994)).
1 United States v. Rural Route No. 1, Box 224, 14 F.3d 864 (3d Cir. 1994).
180 Shelly's Riverside Heights, 859 F. Supp. at 152-53.
.. Id. at 153.
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only significant possessions Deaner owned, the fact that their value did
not approach the maximum allowable criminal fline did not favor
forfeiture in the eyes of the court.'" Because the court found itself ill-
equipped to divide the property and mitigate the loss as the government
suggested, it found the forfeiture "clearly excessive in light of the crime
committed.'.. In fact, the court borrowed the language of an earlier
Third Circuit decision to state that "the attempted forfeiture reaches 'such
a level of excessiveness that in justice the punishment is more criminal
than the crime.
'' 19
c. The Northern District of Alabama
The court for the Northern District of Alabama utilized a similar
proportionality analysis to reach the same conclusion in another § 881
case. In United States v. 461 Shelby County Road, the court rejected the
government's suggestion that a forfeiture could only qualify as excessive
if it "shocks the conscience.' Because such a test seemed designed
to justify the vast majority of forfeitures, the court deduced that:
The United States obviously wants, at all costs, to avoid "propor-
tionality" as the controlling criterion for judging the excessiveness
question, and yet the word "excessive" necessarily implies an analysis
based on an exercise of judicial discretion relating to the degree of an
individual owner's criminal culpability to the severity of the punishment
represented by the value of his property to be divested."
Therefore, in any case where the government has attempted to seize a
person's home, the offender's ability to pay must "dominate the excessive-
ness inquiry."" The court placed great emphasis on this consideration,
stating:
It is much more likely that the taking of the homeplace would constitute
an excessive fine than the taking of other property of equal value.
Society already has more homeless people than it wants or can take care
of, and this court is wary of adding the [claimants] to the list of the
19 Id.
I's Id.
18 Id. (quoting United States v. Sarbello, 985 F.2d 716, 724 (3d Cir. 1993)).
'u 857 F. Supp. 935, 937 (N.D. AiL 1994).
'. Id.
"
9 Id. at 938.
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homeless. It makes this court wince to think of the [claimants] who
have regularly made their home mortgage payments, being forced into
the street while their mortgage payments enure to the benefit of the
United States.'o
The court also agreed with the Middle District of Pennsylvania that
forfeitures present an "all or nothing" proposition.19 ' While not condon-
ing the owner's actions in this case, the court relied on the probation
officer's report to conclude:
The fact that drug trafficking cannot be condoned does not lead
inexorably to the taking away of the only residence of two small drug
traffickers long after those traffickers have paid their debts to society
and have cooperated fully with law enforcement. A taking that would
be as "unfair" as this one would be, would be "excessive.'" 92
Finally, after ruling the forfeiture excessive, the court used the govern-
ment's proposed test against it and concluded: "Nobody has ever accused
this court of being a bleeding heart, but its conscience nevertheless would
be shocked if the [claimants'] residence were forfeited to the United
States in this case."'93
d Courts Using Proportionality in Other Contexts
The Middle District Court of Tennessee also adopted the traditional
Solem factors but refused to decide the issue on a motion to dismiss.'
However, in United States v. Alexander,'" a RICO case remanded to
the Eighth Circuit, which may or may not be relevant in the civil
forfeiture area, 9 ' the court provided a more detailed list of possible
factors for the district courts to consider. According to the Eighth Circuit,
the Supreme Court had directed it to consider "the extent and duration of
"Id.
'1 Id. at 939; see infra notes 266-98 and accompanying text.
461 Shelby County Rdi, 857 F. Supp. at 940.
"Id.
Hill v. State, 868 F. Supp. 221, 221 (M.D. Tenn. 1994) (holding that a claim that
forfeiture violated Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendment rights was sufficient to overcome
motion to dismiss).
32 F.3d 1231 (8th Cir. 1994).
"Id. at 1236 (discussing the difference between forfeiture of proceeds and
punishment).
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Alexander's criminal activities," as well as the gravity of the offense.97
As to the issue of value, the court found "it inherent in the inquiry that
the court determine both the extent of the criminal activity and the
quantum of the property forfeited."' 8 The court quoted Austin to
support this proposition and noted that it felt a forfeiture of proceeds
could not implicate review under the Excessive Fines Clause.99 It then
went on to provide a non-exhaustive list of other areas of possible
inquiry, including "an assessment of the personal benefit reaped by the
defendant, the defendant's motive and culpability and, of course, the
extent that the defendant's interest and the enterprise itself are tainted by
criminal conduct."' The court then qualified its instructions by noting
that "the issue is fact-bound," and that "the language of the Eighth
Amendment demands that a constitutionally cognizable disproportionality
reach such a level of excessiveness that in justice the punishment is more
criminal than the crime."20' Although not extraordinarily helpful in de-
fining the appropriate factors to determine excessiveness, Alexander does
illustrate the breadth of circumstances drawn in for consideration under
the proportionality standard.
2. Austin's Proposed Proportionality Test
Many of the courts engaging in proportionality review have utilized
factors first suggested by Austin in his brief to the Supreme Court
Austin's brief demonstrated the realization that a detailed proportionality
analysis could prove substantially more burdensome than the more
focused instrumentality approach and proposed a threshold excessiveness
inquiry which would eliminate any need to review the forfeiture in the
case of large drug traffickers.2 First, the value of the property seized
would be compared to both the total value of the claimant's assets and the
value of the drugs involved to determine if a prima facie case of
excessiveness existed. If so, the court would need to examine the
forfeiture more closely and the government would have to show the
"Id.
M Id. (citations omitted).
9 1Id.
'Id at 1236-37 (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Sarbello, 985 F.2d 716,
724 (3d Cir. 1993)).
20 Id. at 1237 (quoting Sarbello, 985 F.2d at 724).
20 Brief for Petitioner at part lI.B.6, Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993)
(No. 92-6073) (LEXIS, Genfed Library, Briefs file).
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forfeiture was not grossly disproportionate.0 3 Thus, forfeiture of a large
scale drug trafficker's connected property would probably not involve a
substantial part of his net worth nor would it be grossly in excess of the
value of the drugs involved, and no further examination is needed.
However with a less successful dealer, or any person in possession of a
small amount of drugs, the investigation should proceed.
Austin's brief then suggested factors which the court should consider
to determine excessiveness: the extent of the property's involvement with
the criminal act, whether the property represents the claimant's home or
livelihood, any additional punishment imposed on the owner, the need to
deter the claimant from future activity, and the expenditure of government
funds to investigate and stop the illegal activity occurring on the
property.2 This sort of inquiry looks at the unique facts of the
claimant's case in a way that an instrumentality test does not. Most
notably, the evaluations of the claimant's financial status and the
examination of her motive and depth of involvement in the criminal
activity provide for a highly individualized application of the Excessive
Fines Clause to the circumstances of each case. While a strict reliance on
the Solem factors would have left proportionality with at least some
objective standards, the multi-factor tests involve much more, exposing
the tests to criticism that they are subjective and incapable of providing
meaningful guidance to the lower courts.
D. Tests Combining Instrumentality and Proportionality
1. Courts Applying Combined Tests
a. The Third Circuit
A number of courts have incorporated both proportionality and
instrumentality review into a test which weighs both equally. While the
Third Circuit has not fully articulated its test, in United States v. Rural
Route No. 1, Box 224, the court followed the Eighth Circuit's approach
and suggested a wide range of factors to guide the district courts.2°5
While the court thought that any determination of excessiveness must
include a consideration of the relationship between the property and the
alleged criminal offense, the court cautioned that "the district court
23 Id.
2% Id.
2" 14 F.3d 864, 873-74 (3d Cir. 1994).
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should avoid conflating the Eighth Amendment inquiry with § 881(a)(7)'s
nexus requirement, although the two share some characteristics."2" The
court also mentioned the Solem factors, as well as those found in its
earlier treatment of RICO forfeiture case 0 7
b. The Second Circuit
Prior to the Austin decision, the Second Circuit had applied the
Excessive Fines Clause to an in rem forfeiture in the case of United
States v. 38 Whalers Cove Drive."8 While Whalers Cove clearly
adopted a proportionality test, it focused almost exclusively on a
comparison between the value of the property and the potential criminal
fines to which the claimant was subject.2° This narrow focus caused
some courts to question the propriety of applying the Whalers Cove
analysis to post-Austin civil forfeiture cases, especially those involving
owners who had not directly participated in criminal activity.210
The property at issue in the Milbrand case had been purchased by the
claimant, Marcia Milbrand, and used by her son to establish a substantial
marijuana growing operation. After rejecting Marcia's innocent owner
defense as "simply not credible,"'21' the court addressed her claim that
the forfeiture of the property and improvements valued at approximately
$66,000 violated the Excessive Fines Clause. The Court began by
reviewing the instrumentality approach adopted by the Fourth Circuit, and
its own decision in Whalers Cove which clearly leaned toward proportion-
ality review. Noting that it had yet to address the Excessive Fines issue
where the claimant had not also committed the underlying offense, the
court then announced a new, multi-factor test which includes both
principles.
The new test includes consideration of:
(1) the harshness of the forfeiture (e.g., the nature and value of the
property and the effect of forfeiture on innocen third paries) in -
"I Id. at 873.
2 Id. at 874-76.
- 954 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1991), -rt. denied, 113 S. Ct. 55 (1992).2 9 Id. at 37.
2,0 See United States v. 143-147 East 23rd St, No. 94 Civ. 4148(WP), 1995 WL
353667 (S.D.N.Y. June 12, 1995). The Second Circuit resolved this uncertainty by
explicitly addressing the issue of a non-participating owner in United States v. Milbrand
1995 WL 368907 (2d Cir. June 21, 1995).
21 Milbrand, 1995 WL 368907, at *7.
1994-95]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
comparison to (a) the gravity of the offense, and (b) the sentence that
could be imposed on the perpetrator of such an offense; (2) the
relationship between the property and the offense, including whether use
of the property in the offense was (a) important to the success of the
illegal activity, (b) deliberate and planned or merely incidental and
fortuitous, and (c) temporally or spatially extensive; and (3) the role and
degree of culpability of the owner of the property.
Thus, while the analysis does not ignore the criminal penalties which
could be imposed on the perpetrator of the crime, "[w]here the owner of
the property is not [the criminal] ... , a consistent approach requires
analysis of the amount of the penalty in light of the role and culpability
of the owner in the illicit use of her property."' Applying this analy-
sis, the court found forfeiture of the property well within the boundaries
of the clause. The property served as the site of an extensive drug
operation which could have subjected a criminal defendant to a fine of at
least $2 million. Furthermore, the claimant also had a significant degree
of culpability. Rather than merely passively allowing the illicit use of her
property, Marcia, being "admittedly aware of Mark's involvement in
growing marijuana, ... proceeded to buy him a farm."" In upholding
the forfeiture, the Second Circuit provided the most clearly defined
discussion about the differing factors which come into play when
analyzing the rights of non-participating claimants, rather than those
actively involved in the underlying crime.
c. The Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit has recently joined those courts endorsing a
combined test which includes both instrumentality and proportionality
review."' Rather than giving the two prongs equal weight, however, the
court viewed the instrumentality test as a threshold inquiy 2 5 Before
a forfeiture may proceed, the government bears the burden of establishing
a sufficient connection between the property and the underlying
crime 1 Once this link has been established, the claimant may prevail
212 Id.
2 uId. at *8.
214 United States v. 6380 Little Canyon Rd., No. 93-15982, 1995 WL 408578 (9th Cir.
July 12, 1995).
z" Id. at *5.
216 Id. at *8.
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on her Eighth Amendment claim only by showing that the forfeiture
would impose a grossly disproportionate punishment.2 7
In United States v. 6380 Little Canyon Road, the court discussed the
components of its two pronged test before remanding the case to the
District Court for further consideration. The opinion did not contain much
discussion of the propriety of instrumentality review. Largely for the
historical reasons enunciated by Justice Scalia, the court stated that any
valid forfeiture must satisfy an instrumentality standard. However,
because of this test's "potentially harsh results,"" the court hesitated
to use it as the sole test for excessiveness, and accepted "the proportion-
ality test as a check on the instrumentality approach."219
The court relied on a number of sources to support this decision. It
cited both the Austin majority's refusal to endorse the Scalia approach and
the reduced importance of the criminal/civil distinction in the forfeiture
area as indicating a need for proportionality review tm In addition, such
a test is consistent with the proportionality standard found in cases
decided under the Excessive Bail Clause.22' In keeping with its view
regarding the increasing convergence of criminal and civil forfeiture
standards after Austin, the court also relied on language in United States
v. Alexandert 2  a criminal forfeiture case decided the same day as
Austin, which suggested a need for proportionality review. Finally, the
court felt that "proportionality analysis is especially appropriate in the
civil forfeiture context because it is the sovereign that profits from such
forfeitures .... This incentive enhances the need for close scrutiny of in
rem forfeitures."' m
As to the test itselt the court adopts a fairly standard set of factors.
Those used to determine the harshness of the penalty include: the fair
market value of the property, its intangible value, and the effect of its loss
on the claimant. An evaluation of the claimant's culpability rests on the
owner's level of involvement with the criminal activity, including his
recklessness or negligence in allowing its use and the harm caused by the
activity, including its nature, duration and effect on the community.m
Finally, when the court finds a forfeiture of an entire piece of property
2 7 
Id.
21' Id. at *6.
2 Id.
'Id. at *6-7.2 Id. at *6
222 113 S. Ct. 2766 (1993).
"2 6380 Little Canyon Ad, 1995 WL 408578, at *7.
2 Id. at *8.
1994-95]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
excessive, "the court should limit it to an appropriate portion or the more
poisonously tainted portion of the property."
d The Southern District of California
In Quinones-Ruiz v. United States, the Southern District of California
Court chose to combine proportionality and instrumentality review in its
evaluation of an administrative forfeiture of unreported currency.
"For lack of better authority," ' 7 the court chose to follow a pre-Austin
RICO forfeiture case which it read as endorsing both the nexus and value
requirements ' In applying the proportionality prong of the test, the
court rejected the Central District Court of California's method of
discounting the seriousness of the offense based upon whether the
claimant had been charged or convicted for two reasons. First, the court
could not clearly determine how to implement the procedure. Second, and
more importantly, it found that the discounting method would force the
government to put on any strong evidence of guilt within its possession,
thus "eliminat[ing] the Congressionally mandated probable cause
forfeiture scheme." Therefore, the court compared the forfeiture of the
cash to the maximum permissible sentence under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines for violations of the currency reporting laws. The court found
a "medium' nexus" between the property and the crime, viewing the
essence of the crime as lying to the government; while the money did not
fall into the categories of instrumentality or contraband, it was the subject
of the lie."0 Therefore, according to this court, the forfeiture met the
nexus requirement of the Excessive Fines Clause and thus did not violate
the Constitution.
e. The Southern District of Florida
Like the court for the Middle District of Alabama, the court for the
Southern District of Florida read the Eleventh Circuit as endorsing
2 Id. at *9.
873 F. Supp. 359 (S.D. Cal. 1995). This approach appears consistent with tlb
approach adopted by the Ninth Circuit in the recent case of United States v. 6380 Little
Canyon Rd, No. 93-15982, 1995 WL 408578 (9th Cir. July 12, 1995).
873 F. Supp. at 363-64.
22 United States v. Busher, 817 F.2d 1409 (9th Cir. 1987).
Quinones-Ruiz, 873 F. Supp. at 364.
mo Id.
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proportionality analysis.' But unlike the other district court, the
Florida court adopted a test which balances both proportionality and
instrumentality, without using the instrumentality test as a threshold.
The Florida court's test queries are: "(1) Was there a substantial
connection between the defendant property and the offense in question?"
and "(2) Is the forfeiture of the defendant property a grossly
disproportionate penalty given the nature of the offense involved?" 3
The first part of the test restates the guilty property analysis upon
which the instrumentality test is based. If the government shows a
substantial connection between the property and the offense, then the
claimant must demonstrate gross disproportionality. "This entails
weighing the nature of the offense committed against the value of the
property"' and represents a standard derived from various criminal
forfeiture cases. The court then remanded the issue for further'factual
development.'
f The Northern District of Georgia
The court for the Northern District of Georgia likewise believed the
Eleventh Circuit had endorsed proportionality analysis and, relying in part
on the circuit court's opinion, devised atest which combines instrumental-
ity and proportionality review in a unique way. 7 As the first prong of
its test, the court adopted a straightforward instrumentality approach
which requires a "substantial connection" between the defendant property
and the criminal activity. "The first prong of this test apparently functions
as an 'on/off' switch. if there is not a" sufficient nexus between the
property and the crime, then the forfeiture is an excessive fine, regardless
of the harshness of the penalty or the seriousness of the offense."
Once a forfeiture survives this step, the claimant may still prevail by
showing that the forfeiture would be a grossly disproportionate punish-
ment.O
,1 United States v. 13143 S.W. 15th Lane, 872 F. Sapp. 968, 973 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
2
n Id. at 973-74.
2
n Id. at 973.
M Id. at 974.
213 Id. at 974 n.9.
2m Id. at 974.
,1 United States v. One 1990 Ford Ranger Track, 876 F. Supp. 1283, 1283 (N.D. Ga.
1995).
2" Id. at 1291-92.2" Id at 1292.
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This second step, involving proportionality issues, functions as a
"dimmer switch"; it insures that the severity of the forfeiture roughly
approximates the seriousness of the offense.2" "The amount of 'dim-
ming' needed to close the difference between these two concepts indicates
whether the forfeiture is excessive." ' This test reflects a fairly com-
mon proportionality approach. This court's method differs, however, from
the usual proportionality test in the way that it chose to measure the
harshness of the penalty and the severity of the offense.
The court began its analysis by noting that many other courts have
used the value of the property to measure the harshness of the penalty.
However, the Georgia court agreed with Justice Scalia, who said the
monetary value of the property has no relevance in the forfeiture context
and even more expensive property could be shielded from forfeiture,
Under the Georgia approach, a court should conduct an examination of
the hardship the forfeiture will inflict on the claimant, the subjective
value of the property, and the claimant's financial condition.2 In
evaluating the harshness of the offense, the court rejected an individual-
ized approach and instructed that the focus should be placed on the
offense that supplied probable cause for forfeiture rather than on the
claimant's level of involvement. To reach this conclusion, the court relied
on the fact that the excessiveness issue only arises after the innocent
owner defense has failed.2"
Similarly, the Georgia court rejected the method of calculating the
gravity of the offense by reference to possible civil or criminal penal-
ties. 5 Since maximum penalties are merely hypothetical and the court
has no accurate means to predict whether the full penalty would have
been imposed, the Georgia court thought that this inquiry invites needless
speculation. Instead, the court stated that courts should look at whether
Congress intended the forfeiture laws to punish the type of behavior in
question.2"
In applying its test, the court found that although the truck contained
hallucinogenic psilocin mushrooms when police stopped its driver,
"[t]here was simply nothing special about the truck." " The presence
2 " Id.
241 Id.
24, Id. at 1288-89.
24 Id. at 1289.
u4 Id. at 1289-90.
24 Id. at 1290-91.
m Id.
247 Id. at 1293.
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of the drugs was an isolated event, the driver kept them concealed on his
person rather than in the truck itsell and the claimant did not purchase
the truck for use in criminal activity.2 Despite the fact that only an
incidental link existed between the property and the crime, the court
addressed the proportionality issue for the sake of clarity. The court
concluded that possession of a small amount of mushrooms on one
occasion by someone with no history of drug trafficking did not fall
under the category of serious crimes that Congress intended to reach with
§ 881. While lacking information on the burden the forfeiture imposed on
the claimant, the court felt that "Mickey Mouse" behavior such as this did
not wan-ant a forfeiture?'9 It concluded that "[i]f the forfeiture of [the
claimant's] truck strikes any blow at all against 'racketeering and
organized drug trafficking,' that blow is extremely feeble," and it
overturned the forfeiture.'
g. Other Courts Applying Combined Tests
District courts in Michigan and Ohio have also adopted tests which
include an inquiry into the extent of the property's involvement in the
crime and the value of the property. The Eastern District Court of
Michigan restated the law of forfeiture precedents as a three-pronged
inquiry: (1) how extensively was the property used in the predicate crime,
(2) what is the property's value, and (3) is the forfeiture an excessive
penalty, in light of the answers to the first two prongs.2 ' The first two
steps require factual determinations, while the third forces a court to
"balance the results of the factual determinations with equitable consider-
ations." To answer these questions, a court should look at all the
facts and circumstances of a given case."' When the Michigan court
applied the test, it found that the forfeiture of property valued at $87,000
was appropriate, considering the extensive use of the property in growing
drugs and the amount of the applicable criminal fine ' With even less
discussion, the Southern District Court of Ohio adopted a combined two-
step test, comparing the value of the property combined with the
claimant's criminal sentence to the maximum federal criminal penalty, and
uId.
u" Id. at 1294.
SId.
21 United States v. 2408 Parliament, 859 F. Supp. 1075, 1077-78 (E.D. Micb. 1994).





noting the repeated use of the property as the site of drug sales, to find
the forfeiture constitutional2"
2. Commentary on the Combined Approach
A combined test has some obvious advantages. By giving the
instrumentality approach substantial weight, the court can protect the
government's interest in seizing the tools of criminal activity.' Yet it
is also tre that "the [E]ighth [A]mendment ... embodies fluid concepts
that vary in application with the circumstances of each case." There-
fore, the more unstructured proportionality test allows the courts to
continue to tailor punishments to comport with current notions ofjustice.
Combining the two tests provides a workable compromise between the
government's interest in criminal enforcement and the need to protect
citizens from excessive penalties.
E. Unusual Tests
At least two courts have largely sidestepped the proportion-
ality/instrumentality debate to apply standards which fall outside these
categories. The Southern District Court of Indiana thought earlier dicta
required it to apply the same standard to civil forfeitures as it would to
criminal forfeitures.' The factors necessary for a determination include
"[t]he circumstances surrounding the defendant's criminal conduct, the
harm caused by his conduct, his motive in committing the crime, the
value of the drugs involved, and the nexus between the property used in
the criminal activity." 9 The court also discussed how to best modify
the inquiries to fit their new civil context. For instance, instead of looking
at the harm caused by the claimant's conduct or the claimant's motive in
committing the crime, the court could instead look at the harm caused by
the property itself or at the claimant's motive in allowing the illegal use
2" United States v. 429 S. Main St., 843 F. Supp. 337, 341-42 (S.D. Ohio 1993), a/I'd
in part, rev'd in part, 52 F.3d 1416, 1417 (6th Cir. 1995) (remanding for predeprivation
notice determination).
' See M. Lynette Eaddy, Note, How Much Is Too Much? Civil Forfeitures and the
Excessive Fines Clause After Austin v. United States, 45 RA. L. REV. 709, 730
(1993).
2 Id. at 731 (quoting United States v. Busher, 817 F.2d 1409, 1415 (9th Cir. 1987)).
2 United States v. Rural Route No. 3, Box 288, 1993 U.S. Dist. LES 20102, at
*50 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 22, 1993).
2 Id. at *51 (citation omitted).
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of the property.2 While this approach resembles many of the two-step
tests used by other courts, the Southern District of Indiana is apparently
unique in adopting a standard straight from the criminal law.
The District Court for Colorado has adopted the most unusual
approach. Instead of relying on earlier criminal cases or decisions from
other jurisdictions, the court instead applied a three part test formulated
by the Department of Justice.2 '5
Under this analysis, a civil forfeiture should not violate the Eighth
Amendment where:
A. The criminal activity involving the property has been
sufficiently extensive in terms of time and/or special use of the
property, or
B. The role of the property was integral or indispensable to the
commission of the crime[s] in question; or
C. The particular property was deliberately selected to secure
a special advantage in the commission of the crime[s].'
If the forfeiture can satisfy any one of these factors, then it will not
violate the Excessive Fines Clause.!' While the factors resemble those
used in the instrumentality tests, this test is more government-oriented
because only one of three possible factors must be satisfied to establish
constitutionality. The court decided that the forfeiture of the claimant's
real an personal property proved consistent with the Eight Amendment,
in part because "the thrust of the case law suggests that forfeitures should
rise to the level of an excessive fine only in the rarest of cases."
Since the forfeiture did not reach "draconian!' levels, it survived
scrutiny.2 5 While the government obviously supports this standard,
most courts have not adopted a constitutional standard which so favors
the state, and the decision remains outside the mainstream.
V. APPLYING THE TEST - THE CouRT's ABILITY TO MITIGATE
In addition to the substantive question of determining excessiveness,
the Supreme Court's refusal to define a standard has given rise to a
20 Id. at *52.
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number of procedural questions as the courts apply the tests that they
have designed. Courts have concluded that excessiveness should be
decided by the trier of fact.2 The burden of proof remains less clearly
definedV2 Finally, the propriety of ordering a forfeiture of less than all
As the Third Circuit acknowledged, neither Austin nor its companion case,
Alexander, provides any guidance as to whether the judge or jury decides if a forfeiture
violates the Excessive Fines Clause. See United States v. Rural Route No. 1, Box 224,
14 F.3d 864, 876 (3d Cir. 1994). The Court of Appeals went on to quote a pre-Auslin
case which suggested that in the civil forfeiture arena, "the infusion of the earthy
common sense of a jury might upon occasion mitigate appropriately the harsh impact
sometimes characteristic of in rem procedure." Id. (quoting United States v. One 1976
Mercedes Benz 280S, 618 F.2d 453, 469 (7th Cir. 1980)). However, that court ultimately
left the decision to the District Court suggesting that, due to the current uncertainty of the
law, the District Court submit a special interrogatory to the jury, and alternately treat the
answer as non-binding and decide the case itself.
The court in 461 Shelby County Road also noted that whether the court or the jury
should determine excessiveness remains a matter of speculation. United States v. 461
Shelby County Rd., 857 F. Supp. 935, 937 (N.D. Ala. 1994). It then went on to decide
the case by granting summary judgment sua sponte in favor of the claimant, because the
government had conceded the absence of any genuine issues of material fact Id. at 940.
However, in United States v. 24124 Lemay St., the court specifically ruled that the issue
presented a question of law. See 857 F. Supp. 1373, 1376 (C.D. Cal. 1994). To support
its holding, the court pointed to the manner in which courts decide alleged violations of
the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments, all of which also raise questions of law. Id. at
1376-77. Therefore, it believed that the court should decide the issue of excessiveness as
well, and granted summary judgment. Id. at 1383-84.
' In both cases adopting proportionality tests and those stressing instrumentality
concerns, some courts have chosen to place the primary burden of showing excessiveness
on the claimant. For instance, in Shelly's Riverside Heights, primarily a proportionality
case, the Middle District of Pennsylvania cited a pre-Austin decision for the proposition
that once the government has demonstrated probable cause to believe the property
facilitated a crime, "the burden then shifts to the defendant." 851 F. Supp. 633, 637
(M.D. Pa. 1994) (citing United States v. Sarbello, 985 F.2d 716 (3d Cir. 1993)). Similarly,
in United States v. 1215 Kelly Road, a case applying the California instrumentality test
to the forfeiture of a cabin and small farm, the Western District of Washington recognized
"that the United States has made a prima facie case for forfeiture and that the burden is
now upon the claimants to show that forfeiture of the entire fifteen acres would be an
excessive fine ... ." 860 F. Supp. 764, 766 (W.D. Wash. 1994). Thus, in appropriate
cases, the government may receive summary judgment unless the claimant introduces
evidence sufficient to support an Eighth Amendment claim.
In contrast, in many cases adopting a two-step approach combining the tests, the
government will often shoulder some of the burden beyond merely proving the elements
of forfeiture. Under this approach, the court must undertake Eighth Amendment review
"once the claimant raises the specter of excessiveness." United States v. 13143 S.W. 15th
Lane, 872 F. Supp. 968, 974 (S.D. Fla. 1994). The government bears the initial burden
of establishing a substantial connection between the property and the offense, by showing
a "pattern of illegal activities occuning at the defendant real property." United States v.
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of the property sought in order to reach a more just result a process often
urged upon the court by the government to preserve otherwise excessive
seizures, has caused considerable controversy and already resulted in a
split among the lower courts. The government apparently urges such
"mitigation!' fairly frequently when it appears that the court may rule in
favor of the claimant." Claimants also make the argument for mitiga-
tion in an effort to salvage what they can from a successful forfeiture
action. The courts have disagreed on the role of mitigation, with some
accepting evidence of possible mitigation and even incorporating it into
their tests, and others questioning not only their willingness, but also their
ability, to divide the property in this fashion.
A. Courts Which View Forfeiture as All or Nothing
The government presented the case in favor of mitigation to the
Middle District of Pennsylvania, arguing on rehearing that the court
should instead mitigate the excessiveness of a forfeiture which it had
previously overturned on constitutional grounds.' The government had
sought a ten acre tract of land and a cabin allegedly used in the cultiva-
tion of drugs and owned in joint tenancy by the claimant and his
companion.270 Comparing the culpability of the property to the serious-
ness of the offense, the court found the forfeiture of the entire tract
excessive. " In response to the government's suggestion that the court
allow something less than the total forfeiture, the court replied that-while
"[a] monetary fine may be lessened by a certain dollar increment; a
forfeiture is essentially an all-or-nothing penalty."2 ' With regard to
427 & 429 Hall St., 853 F. Supp. 1389, 1399 (M.D. Ala. 1994). If the government meets
this standard, the burden shifts and the claimant must show that the forfeiture would
amount to a grossly disproportionate penalty, through a comparison of the value of the
property and the nature of the offense. The courts have adapted this grossly disproportion-
ate standard from a variety of criminal cases. See, e.g., United States v. 6380 Little
Canyon Rd., No. 93-15982, 1995 WL 408578 (9th Cir. July 12, 1995).
Only one court has addressed the actual level of proof required, rather than the
allocation of the burden, and defined the appropriate standard as a preponderance of the
evidence. United States v. Shelly's Riverside Heights, 851 F. Supp. 633, 637 (M.D. Pa.
1994).
See infra notes 269-81 and accompanying text.
United States v. Shelly's Riverside Heights, 859 F. Supp. 150, 154 (M.D. Pa.
1994).
2
" Id. at 151.




approving the forfeiture of the cabin alone, the court stated "[i]t is not clear
that we have authority to do so and we are not inclined to divide up the
property - Solomon-like - leaving a cabin with no access and a parcel of
property with an island in the middle." 73 Therefore, because the court
refused to mitigate the excess, the courtI earlier ruling of excessiveness stood
and the claimants retained their property.2
The Northern District of Alabama also ruled against the govemment in
a case in which the concept of mitigation received substantial attention.275
The United States seized the home of the claimants under § 881(a)(7), but the
court relied in part on the report of the claimants' probation officer to
conclude that they had paid their debt to society and deserved no further
punishment, especially punishment of this magnitude In the court's
original order it invited suggestions on "how to accomplish the miracle of
declaring forfeited less than all of [the claimant equity in their house]."'
The court appeared to criticize the governmentIs reliance on the courts to tend
to the consequences of the government's lack of restraint. The court pointed
out that "[w]hen the United States undertakes a forfeiture, it is the United
States which has selected the amount of the Tine,' and not the Congress, and
not the courts.' 12 78 Using the example of the owner of a 100,000 acre ranch
who knows one of his hired hands is "peddling pot" from the bunkhouse, the
court illustrated its difficulty with the concept of mitigation:
While this court acknowledges its responsibility to discriminate between
"excessive" and "non-excessive" fines, it does not acknowledge that it, or
any other court, is capable of declaring and implementing apartial forfeiture
inorderto prevent the punishment from being too severe, namely, being out
of proportion to the criminal conduct. The very prospect of ordering the
forfeiture of a 0.001 undivided interest in a 100,000 acre ranch, as reflective
of the owner' failure to report his marijuana-selling ranchhand, is only
topped by the thought of attempting to carve out a particular couple of hilly
acres from the 100,000 acres, together with ingress and egress to it, and
vesting it neatly in the United States. No court, high or low, has thus far




' United States v. 461 Shelby County Rd., 857 F. Supp. 935 (N.D. Ala. 1994).
27 Id. at 940.
Id. at 936 nA.
27 Id. at 939.
2 9 Id.
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Because the court "seriously doubts that any federal judge has the time,
the Solomonic wisdom, and the magic wand with which to perform the
miracle of achieving proportionality in forfeiture cases in which the value
of the property proposed to be forfeited clearly exceeds the owner's
culpability,"8 it concluded that the all-or-nothing approach presented
the only solution. Since the forfeiture of the entire property constituted
an excessive fine, and division proved "impractical, if not impossi-
ble,"281 the claimants prevailed.
B. Courts Which Allow Mitigation of the Forfeiture
In contrast to the courts which find mitigation impossible, some
apparently believe that Austin requires them to consider the possibility.
In a brief opinion, the Court for the Western District of Washington
began by recognizing "that the general rule has been that property subject
to forfeiture is all that which was simultaneously conveyed by a single
deed." However the court then noted that strict application of this
rule would avoid consideration of the excessiveness issue, in direct
contravention of Ausfin. The court apparently discounted the possibil-
ity of applying Austin review to the entire parcel of property and simply
declaring too large a forfeiture unconstitutional. Rather, the Court decided
that it "may choose to forfeit only a portion of the property, instead of
the entire [area] described by the claimants' deed, if it finds that forfeiture
of the entire property would be an excessive flne." The court placed
the burden of suggesting possible divisions of the property on the
claimants.?5 This leaves them in the position of arguing against divi-
sion and hoping that the court will find the entire forfeiture excessive, but
taking the chance that they will lose everytfing, or suggesting ways to
preserve a forfeiture which might otherwise have violated the Excessive
Fines Clause. Thus, a willingness to mitigate appears to favor the
government in this case.
In a Fourth Circuit case, the claimant failed to introduce evidence





221 Id. at 940.
m United States v. 1215 Kelly Rd., 860 F. Supp. 764, 765 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
2U4 Id.2U Id.
n' Id. at 766.




enunciated by the couit, he lost his entire thirty-three acre fan. While the test
used by the court included an inquiry into "the possibility of separating
offending property that can readily be separated from the remainder," the
court also felt that "a judgment of forfeiture is largely an all-or-nothing
situation... However, a concern about excessiveness may be tempered by
the pragmatic possibility of separating offensive property from nonimplicated
property, when the offending property is readily separable." The court
adopted a practical approach, designed to give claimants a chance to salvage
some of their property. As in the previous case allowing mitigation, the
claimant bears the burden of showing the divisibility of the property.
The Ninth Circuit has also strongly endorsed the mitigation ofpotentially
excessive forfeitures.0 ' In fhct, it has stated, "[a] forfeiture of an owner's
.property that was an instrumentality of the crime, but which appears to be an
excessive fine, within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment must be
reduced.!" A forfeiture may still be disproportionate even if the entire
parcel of property served as the instrumentality of a crime. In such a case, the
court should limit the forfeiture to "an appropriate portion or the more
poisonously tainted portion of property."
Finally, a number of criminal cases have endorsed the mitigation princi-
plC. in United States v. Toyfoya, the Northern District of California quoted
at length a pre-Austin Ninth Circuit decision which appeared to grant the
court wide latitude to fashion a remedy to avoid the cancellation of a
forfeiture on Eighth Amendment grounds: 3
If, on remand in this case, the district court finds ... [the forfeiture is
excessive], it must limit the forfeiture to such a portion of the interest as it
deems consistent with these principles; or it may condition the forfeiture
upon the payment of such sum or relinquishment of such other property as
seems just under the circumstances; or it may limit or eliminate other
punishment it would otherwise impose so as to bring the total sanction
within constitutional bounds?'
2 U Id. at 365.
' Id. at 364.
20 Id. at 366.
United States v. 6380 Little Canyon Rd., No. 93-15982, 1995 WL 408578, *8 (9th
Cir. July 12, 1995).
291 Id. (emphasis added).
2hId. at *9.
3 No. CR-93-0505 EFL, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12266, at *17 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29,
1994).
2 Id. at *17-18 (quoting United States v. Busher, 817 F.2d 1409, 1416 (9th Cir.
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The court appeared inclined to adopt the view "that judicial mitigation of
the extent of the forfeiture is the remedy once an Eighth Amendment
violation is found. ' 5 The Eighth Circuit has also endorsed the tailoring
of the forfeiture in order to preserve its constitutionality in the criminal
context." These cases may help tip the balance toward mitigation in
the civil context, since some courts appear predisposed to adopt that view
in any case. Perhaps to limit criticism of its narrow excessiveness
standard, the Department of Justice continues to support mitigation in a
number of circumstances. In its proposed regulations, the Justice
Department would allow ruling officers to mitigate based on findings of
hardship or adequate excuse. 7 Mitigating factors would include efforts
on behalf of the claimant toward reform, and a proportionality analy-
sis.' By making these concessions at the mitigation stage, the Depart-
ment of Justice may deflect some criticism of its narrow excessiveness
standard.
CONCLUSION
A. Comparison and Analysis of the Proposed Tests
In most cases, an application of either instrumentality or proportional-
ity review will yield the same results. If the government seizes a very
expensive boat carrying a large quantity of drugs, the forfeiture may stand
either because the owner has clearly allowed the boat to play an
important role in the drug trade or because the value of the drugs
involved will probably approach that of the boat. Conversely, if the
government seizes a similarly valued vehicle after finding a sufficiently
small amount of drugs as to indicate only personal use, the Excessive
Fines Clause could bar the forfeiture because the vehicle has only an
incidental connection to the drugs, or because their value and the owner's
culpability appear small by comparison. In most cases involving drugs for
personal use, it would stretch the boundaries of either test to seize
everything but contraband and its derivatives.
1987) (alteration in original)).
295Ida at *78.
29 United States v. Bieri, 21 F.3d 819, 824 (8th Cir. 1994) (stating that if a district
court finds in a particular case that forfeiture amounts to an excessive fine in violation
of the Eighth Amnendment, that court has the discretion to "order forfeiture of less than
the whole in an effort to preserve the forfeiture... -'I.





Other cases present a harder choice. Take the example of a low
income family growing marijuana on their small farm. Almost certainly,
the forfeiture of the property would pass the instrumentality test, since the
criminal activity could not have occurred without the land. However,
proportionality analysis could reach a different conclusion based on a
consideration of the claimant's financial status, the extent of the criminal
activity, and other factors unique to the case.
In these latter cases, the government would clearly prefer an
instrumentality approach. Given its decision to focus on seizing proceeds,
the Department of Justice will probably continue to promote tests based
on the link between the property and the criminal activity.' Such an
approach does have some obvious advantages. The fact that it relies on
only one inquiry rather than the multiple factors present in proportionality
tests indicates an ease of application that the other approach lacks. Instead
of looking at the value of the seized property, possible criminal sanctions,
the level of the claimant's involvement with the crime, and her financial
status, the court may focus all its attention on the connection between the
property and the crime. This test would require less factual development
and seems more amenable to resolution on summary judgment. Of course,
the Eighth Amendment does not guard against judicial confusion, and
ease of application can only weigh in favor of a test which fulfills the
substantive requirements of the clause.
The instrumentality test seems on its face consistent with the
commonly understood rationale of forfeiture. As the Fourth Circuit
pointed out, Congress did not intend to establish any particular dollar fine
in the forfeiture statutes, but rather to punish by seizing whatever
property the criminal activity tainted." However, application of the
Excessive Fines Clause of the Constitution should not depend on
Congressional intent. Actually, one could argue that the Eighth Amend-
ment exists precisely because Congress may one day intend to impose an
excessive fine. While the courts may feel that excessiveness in the
forfeiture context means confiscating non-tainted property and nothing
else, they should not feel bound to adopt this view by congressional
actions.
The instrumentality test has also received praise for its usefulness in
limiting judicial discretion."1 By narrowing the range of permissible
factors, the test should in theory provide more guidance to courts in
' See Forfeiture Manual Signals Help for ictims, supra note 84.
30 See United States v. Chandler, 36 F.3d 358, 364 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 1792 (1995).
'3 See Leading Cases, supra note 170, at 214.
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making their decisions. Courts have especially focused on a review of the
claimant's culpability as entailing a substantial abuse of discretion.30
Yet the instrumentality test itself seems susceptible to varying applica-
tions. For example, consider the forfeiture of a house whose owner used
its telephone to arrange for the sale of drugs at another location. Many
people would consider this precisely the sort of incidental or fortuitous
link between the crime and the property which would make the forfeiture
excessive. Yet the Northern District of Illinois did not consider the link
insufficient as a matter of law. 3 Any test will have to deal with
drawing the line between excessive and permissive forfeitures and the
application of any test will involve discretion. The instrumentality test
limits the exercise of this discretion to a more clearly defined area but
does not eliminate it.
The instrumentality test is particularly helpful in establishing a
minimum threshold which all forfeitures must meet. Forfeiture is best
suited for property closely linked to crime. If the property bears only a
slight relationship to the offense, regardless of its value, its confiscation
serves little purpose' apart from enriching the government. Such a
forfeiture punishes the owner exactly as a criminal fine would, without
removing either the mechanism or the rewards of the criminal activity,
yet the owner probably remains subject to criminal penalties linked to the
same behavior. By limiting forfeitures to cases where the government can
identify a minimum connection between the crime and the property, the
courts can preserve forfeiture as a useful weapon against those deeply
involved in criminal activity, while avoiding the most obviously incon-
gruous results.
Proportionality tests are desirable because they allow the courts to
consider certain factors which an instrumentality test would rule out. For
instance, some courts believe that any determination of excessiveness
must include an evaluation of the forfeiture's impact on the financial
status of the claimant. To these courts, the confiscation of a pauper's
shack may violate the Constitution, whereas the confiscation of a
millionaire's mansion would not. This distinction is fair policy. Seizing
" See United States v. 427 & 429 Hall St., 853 F. Supp. 1389 (M.D. Ala. 1994)
(discounting culpability as a factor).
' See United States v. Rural Route No. 1, Mound Rd., No. 90-C-4722, 1994 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 6433 (N.D. M. May 16, 1994) (stating that numerous phone calls from the
residence to negotiate the sale and purchase of illegal drugs constituted the primary
relationship between the house and the seized residence and that "[wihile this telephonic
link is not overwhelming, [the court] cannot say that it is so tenuous as to render
forfeiture excessive as a matter of law.").
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aperson' house and only property implicates the traditional protections given
to the homeplace, and may simply swell the ranks of the homeless or the
bankrupt?3 On the other hand, consideration of such individualized
circumstances makes uniformity ofpenalties impossible. Although usually we
guard against favoritism toward the rich, treating claimants differently on the
basis of personal wealth for any reason may raise concerns about fairness.
However, this argument is not persuasive. Indigent defendants often receive
concessions unavailable to other parties in order to preserve constitutional
rights such as representation by counsel, and perhaps an analogy could be
drawn to the preservation of Eighth Amendment protections as well.
A more relevant inquiry is the degree of the claimant's culpability.
Although the Middle District of Alabama correctly points out it will reach the
constitutional issue only alter an innocent owner defense has failed,
distinctions may still exist between the person who allows illegal activity on
her property and the person who engages in illegal activity herself The
criminal law may not even punish the former, while it imposes substantial
penalties on the latter. Given the drastic impact that a forfeiture can have,
perhaps it is a penalty best reserved for serious offenses. While differentiating
between varying degrees of culpability may involve substantial discretion,
especially in drug cases, the current administration abandonment of the
"zero-tolerance' drug policy could encourage courts willing to make such
distinctions"
Although comparing the harshness of the penalty to the gravity of the
offense does serve some purpose, the other factors derived from the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause via Solem do not fit as well in the forfeiture
context. The fact that forfeiture involves widely varying types of property, as
opposed to uniform monetary fines, makes any comparison of both inter- and
intra-jurisdiction penalties difficult2 °7 Additionally, any proportionality
analysis, including those employing the Solem factors, must necessarily
present a relatively fact specific inquiry, with each case involving unique
circumstances. Therefore, any extended discussion of these comparative
factors would likely be of limited value 8
" See United States v. 461 Shelby County Rd., 857 F. Supp. 935, 938 (N.D. Ala.
1994) (noting that "[s]ociety already has more homeless people than it wants or can take
care of....").
31 See 427 & 429 Hall St., 853 F. Supp. at 1400.
31 See United States v. $191,910.00 in United States Currncy, 16 F.3d 1051, 1054
n.1 (9th Cir. 1994) (acknowledging that the currnt administration has abandoned the
former "war on drugs" stance).
3- See Leading Cases, supra note 170, at 214.
301 United States v. One 1990 Ford Ranger Truck, 876 F. Supp. 1283, 1288 (N.D. Ga.
1995) ("[Wjhile uniform application of civil forfeiture laws might be a laudable goal, the
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Similarly, while the court must evaluate the harshness of the penalty
according to some standard, the Sentencing Guidelines are a poor
comparison. They do illustrate what criminal penalties the government
could have chosen to pursue, and perhaps by analogy how seriously
Congress and the Sentencing Commission view the underlying offense,
but the fact remains that the government did not choose that avenue. The
government actually may have rejected the criminal approach due to
doubts in its ability to meet the burden of proof.3.9 To have the crimi-
nal sanction then become relevant in defining the civil penalty is absurd.
The Sentencing Guidelines may substantially overstate the appropriate
penalty. This is especially true when the claimant has been acquitted of
the underlying activity."' On the other hand, a forfeiture which other-
wise meets the appropriate criteria should not fail simply because the
value of the property exceeds the permissible criminal fine. Since
Congress did not view the penalties as mutually exclusive, their view of
what serves as the appropriate fine in one instance should not set the
standard in the other. Additionally, the Sentencing Guidelines have
received criticism for failing to make the fine distinctions which propor-
tionality review tends to emphasize. 1' This does leave the determina-
tion without many objective guideposts, but a forthright admission of
discretionary decision-making may avoid more problems than a mistaken
reliance on more objective criteria.
Even with these drawbacks, the Excessive Fines Clause itself seems
to call for some type of proportionality review. The word "excessive"
implies a comparison of factors.31 At one time, the Supreme Court
endorsed proportionality review under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause,"3 and even Justice Scalia's rejection of proportionality in that
context relied in part on an argument that the Cruel and Unusual
court finds no practical method of achieving that result.').
3- See id. at 1288, 1290.
311 See Leading Cases, supra note 170, at 214 ("Because drug laws developed during
the 'waron drugs' often permit disproportionate sentencing, there may be no 'proportional'
guideposts against which to measure one's judgment.').
311 See, e.g., Stuart Taylor, Jr., Janet Reno's Test of Courage, AX LAWYER, Sept.
1993, at 34, 35 (urging the reform of drug sentencing).
31 See United States v. One 1990 Ford Ranger Truck, 876 F. Supp. 1283, 1287 (N.D.
Ga. 1995) ('[]he wording of the clause suggests a proportionality inquiry: a forfeiture
can only be 'excessive' if it is compared to something else"); see also United States v.
461 Shelby County Rd., 857 F. Supp. 935, 937 (N.D. Ala. 1994).
3 See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284-90 (1983) (stating that "[tihe principle that
a punishment should be proportionate to the crime is deeply rooted and frequently
repeated in common-law jurisprudence").
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Punishment Clause "did not explicitly prolibit 'disproportionate' or
'excessive' punishments,"' "" a problem not presented here. More
informatively, in a case decided under the Excessive Bail Clause, the
Court noted that the word "excessive" denotes disproportionality between
the level of bail and the risk of flight."5 With Austin eroding the
distinction between criminal and civil forfeitures, these other standards
suggest possible content for a test under the Excessive Fines Clause.
B. A Combined Test
As this discussion indicates, there is a place for both instrumentality
and proportionality review of civil forfeiture. Clearly, "it makes sense to
scrutinize government action more closely when the state stands to
benefit."3 '6 To guard against excessiveness in this area of the law, a test
should consider both the use of the defendant property in criminal
activity, and the claimant's culpability as compared to the severity of the
sanction. By using the instrumentality approach as a threshold, and
requiring the government to carry the burden of establishing a substantial
connection between the forfeited property and the crime, the courts may
preserve forfeiture as an effective weapon against property used primarily
for illegal purposes and interject stability into the law. This objectivity
assumes greater importance when one recognizes the difficulty of
comparing punishments in forfeiture cases.31 ' However, despite the
considerable appeal of objective standards, any excessiveness determina-
tion should also include an evaluation of the claimants' culpability, which
may vary greatly in forfeiture cases, in relation to the severity of the
penalty. By combining the two inquiries, the courts can design a
manageable excessiveness standard which best fulfills the requirements
of the Constitution.
314 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 967 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1951).
316 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 978 n.9.
317 See Leading Cases, supra note 170, at 214 ('In the area of civil asset forfeiture,
however, the power of objective compaison [of like cases] is substantially constrained.").
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